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Abstract 
Surveys of U.S. market participants reveal a belief that liquidity improves following a 
share split. Contrary to this, empirical studies on U.S. markets generally conclude 
that liquidity worsens. These contradictory views have as yet not been reconciled. 
-· I•.-, ¥• 
I 1 ~-; -• • ·.,. , -. .) 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange ("the JSE"). 
The primary objective of this study is to understand how liquidity, as measured by 
trading volumes, changes around a share split on the JSE. The study also seeks to 
gain a more precise understanding of the nature of any change in liquidity in order 
that it may be related to the effect that a split has on volatility and returns . 
Twenty-three share splits were selected from the period between December 1990 
and June 1996. These splits were screened to ensure that no contemporaneous 
events were pre:;ent which may have influenced the results . Five study periods were 
then defined around each split. These periods were as follows: 
Period 
Period 1 
Period 2 
Period 3 
Period 4 
Period 5 
Seen graphically, 
Profit 
announcement 1 
I I I 
·~--61 days-- ~ 
Period 1 
Description 
A period of 61 trading days set around the first profit announcement 
occurring at least three months prior to the split announcement date. 
A period of 61 trading days immediately prior to the day on which the 
split was announced . 
A period of 20 days falling a similar number of days after the 
announcement date as before the ex-date. 
A period of 61 trading days immediately following the day on which the 
ex-date of the split occurred . 
A period of 61 trad ing days set around the first profit announcement 
occurring at least 3 months after the split ex-date 
Announcement Ex-date 
I I I I 
·---6 1 days---.., •. -20 days- · 
Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
I 
rrotit 
announcement :: 
I 
Period 5 
I 
These separate periods allowed the analysis of the timing of any change in trading 
volumes to be made with more precision . 
iii 
The daily adjusted trading volumes (actual number of shares traded adjusted for the 
share split) were obtained for each share in each period . A comparison was then 
made between each of the periods using a matched sign test to determine if there 
, ,as a change in tr?.ding volurres bet1.i11een consecutive periods. This was done by 
com anng me prcportion of days wnere the volumes in one period exceeaed the 
volumes in the comparison period . So for example, day 1 in the period 1 for the first 
share in the sample was compared to day 1 in period 2 for the same share. Day 2 
was then compared to day 2 and so on . 
The results showed that that there were two distinct increases in trading volume 
around the split: 
the first occurred prior to the announcement of the split; and 
the secor.d occurred following the ex-date. 
To determine exactly when these changes occurred the matched sign test was 
repeated using narrower study periods. Based on these revised periods the results 
showed that the first increase occurred immediately prior to the announcement date 
and that, given its timing , this increase was probably in anticipation of the split 
announcement. The ex-date increase occurred immediately after the ex-date. 
Further analysis was then conducted to determine whether the increases in trading 
volumes were associated with : 
an increase in trading frequency (i .e. an increase in the proportion of days 
within a period on which trade occurred) ; and/or 
an increase in total trading volumes. 
The results of this analysis demonstrated that the announcement date was 
characterised by a significant increase in total volumes but no significant change in 
trading frequency. The period between the announcement and ex-date showed a 
decline in total volumes. The increase at the ex-date was characterised by a 
significant increase in both total volumes and in trading frequency . 
These results were different to those from U.S. studies which tend to find a decrease 
in trading volumes following a share split. On closer examination there are certain 
similarities between the current findings and those from U.S. studies. 
The increase in total trad ing volumes immediately prior to the announcement and 
the decline in total volumes in the period between the announcement date and the 
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ex-date are consistent with findings from U.S. markets. The only difference therefore 
appears to be the increase in trading volumes following the ex-date . 
Yet even in terms of this increase similarities may be found as U.S. studies have 
notec 2.-: ir.c~2a~e i t:-2 r.umber of trans2.ctions followi ng a share split. It appears 
from other evidence on the JSE that the change in trading frequency, identified in 
the current study, is related to an increase in the number of transactions and 
therefore is consistent with the change on U.S. markets. 
The question is then why U.S. markets do not show a corresponding increase in 
total volumes even though they experience an increase in the number of 
transactions . In all probability the answer to this question lies in differences in the 
underlying levels of liquidity present on the markets prior to the split. In other words , 
the JSE is so thinly traded that a change in the number of transactions has a 
significant impact on total trading volumes as even small trading volumes may be 
significant when measured against the low base. Conversely, U.S. markets are 
already fully traded and therefore any increase in the number of transactions 
following a split does not lead to a significant increase in total volumes .. 
If the above hypothesis is correct, then the results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that the split results in an influx of smaller investors into the market as these 
investors could have the effect of increasing the number of transactions without 
causing a significant increase in total trading volumes. Such an influx may also 
account for the sustained increase in volatility noted after the ex-date of a split. 
In summary, the present study finds that there is a sustained increase in trading 
volumes following a split. The study however, also suggests that the increase in 
liquidity conceals a number of separate effects - an increase in total trading volumes 
prior to the announcement date (which is followed by a decrease) and an increase in 
total trading volumes and in the frequency of trade following the ex-date. The 
conclusion drawn as to how a share split effects trading volumes therefore depends 
on considerations such as when that change is measured and on whether the effect 
of the split on smaller investors is considered . These considerations are the likely 
source of the conflict between the views of the market participants and the evidence 
from empirical studies. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Sria1 e sp1 i, · .:, . - ... :a r,ave no eccncrr.ic e:-:'2c: as L, sy ,i1sr2.y divide thE ,::; lue cf t,,E 
firm into smaller units with no changes in cash flows or assets. Nevertheless, firms 
persist in splitting their shares and empirical studies have repeatedly shown that 
splits are associated with changes in value. 
Changes in value may be seen in the positive returns around the split event or in 
increased return volatility . These changes are not only contradictory but they have 
not been adequately explained in the literature. The difficulty in formulating an 
explanation is that different answers may be found depending on whether the 
changes are measured around the announcement date or the ex-date (the date on 
which the split actually happens), and whether they are measured over short or 
long periods . 
Traditional theories attribute these changes in value to changes in liquidity brought 
about by the split . These theories, while popular amongst market participants , have 
not found support in studies on U.S. markets which have tended to show that , 
contrary to expectations, liquidity worsens following a split. Despite its apparent 
simplicity the effects of a share split, both empirically and analytically, remains 
unclear and therefore a subject for further study. This is particularly relevant in 
South Africa where the fundamental changes brought about by a split have not 
been clarified. 
Empirical work on share splits may be divided into three main areas : 
changes in returns; 
changes in volatility/risk; and 
changes in liquidity. 
While liquidity has not been the subject of much empirical research the effects of a 
split appear to be inter-linked. Understanding the change in liquidity is therefore 
fundamental to understanding the causes behind the changes in both returns and 
volatility (this will be expanded upon later) . 
Of these, changes in returns have received the most attention both internationally 
and in studies based on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange ("the JSE"). The 
objective of this dissertation is to determine the effect of a share split on the 
liquidity of a share, as measured its trading activity. 
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This objective may be analysed into the following sub-objectives: 
- :: : -?'.':'- --- · - = ::. _ :"; C: er. :t,e r2levsr.t !it~r2: ·_ ·s 'Nhat the effects of a spl it 
are, how may they be explained and in what way are these effects and 
explanations inter-related. 
2. To determine the role played by liquidity and how it is affected by a split. 
3. Given the findings in the literature, to determine whether there is a change 
in liquidity following a split on the JSE. 
This dissertation is organised as follows: In chapter 2 and 3 the available literature 
concerning the effect that a split has on returns and risk is reviewed . Chapter 4 
examines the question of information and the models which attempt to explain the 
effects of a split. Finally, chapter 5 examines the change in liquidity itself. This 
circuitous approach is adopted as it is necessary to examine each effect in the 
-
context of the other effects to gain an understanding of their inter-relationship. 
Given this holistic direction, the literature review will not merely provide an outline 
of the relevant literature, but will attempt to provide theoretical development to 
serve as a basis for the empirical work which follows. 
The empirical work is set out is chapter 6 and measures the change in trading 
volumes across a number of periods set around the split event. The use of these 
periods allows the change in trading volumes to be measured with more precision 
than has been done previously. This in turn allows the changes in trading volume to 
be matched to the changes observed in returns and volatility . The timing of these 
changes then forms the basis for the conclusions in chapter 7. 
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Chapter 2~ Changes in returns around a share split 
J. n ro uction 
Empirical studies provide consistent evidence, supporting the commonly held view, 
that share splits are associated with positive returns. These returns fall within three 
distinct periods, namely the period prior to the announcement of the split, the period 
around the announcement and the period around the ex-date (the date on which the 
number of shares actually increases) . These periods are often not clearly 
distinguished in the studies which is unfortunate as it adds to the confusion 
surrounding the effects of a split. Furthermore, the existence of distinct periods 
suggests the presence of different causes and hence different relationships between 
each period 's returns and the split. This chapter will examine, by means of a review 
of the available literature, the behavior of returns in each of these three periods . It 
will also consider whether the returns in each period are caused by the split , or 
whether the returns have another source. 
2. Changes in returns 
Changes in returns may be measured in different ways depending on the nature of 
the study in which they are found . This makes comparison between the studies more 
complicated. For simplicity, the measures of returns may be divided into one of two 
categories: 
Raw-
Adjusted-
Returns measured as the change in price from one period to the next, 
which may be adjusted for dividends. 
Raw returns adjusted by a normal return. The normal return provides 
a benchmark. This benchmark may be an average of previous returns 
of the share or returns in the market, or may be risk adjusted 
(normally using a variation of the market model) . 
The comparison of returns across different studies is further complicated by the use, 
in some studies, of screens intended to counter the influence of simultaneous 
events . While the presence of such events , coinciding with the split , may influence 
returns it is important to note that different screens may themselves influence the 
results such that the correction of a distortion causes a distortion itself. 
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Studies of returns often include both share splits and share dividends. While similar 
. . 
in sonie respects , share dividends and share splits have a number of important 
differences, amongst these: 
share dividends are often declared in lieu of cash dividends and so impact on 
dividend signaling ; 
share dividends reduce distributable reserves and hence affect future 
dividends; and 
share dividends may be recognised as accounting income by the recipient 
whereas share splits may not. 
These differences suggest that share splits and share dividends have a different 
impact on returns which would influence the results obtained from a joint sample. 
Taking these complications into account the following sections explore the change in 
returns across each of the three periods . 
3. Pre-announcement period 
The pre-announcement period is the period prior to the announcement of a share 
split. As such , it is open ended and may stretch from weeks to years prior to the 
announcement. Figure 1 sets out the findings from a number of studies relating to 
returns over this period. 
Figure 1: Findings on pre-announcement returns 
Study Measure used Share splits I Result 
dividends (returns) 
Fama, Fischer, Jensen and Roll Risk adjusted Split Positive 
(1969) 
Asquith , Healy and Palepu (1989) Market adjusted, Split Positive 
risk adjusted 
Maloney and Mulerin (1992) Raw Split Positive 
Manan and Liliana (1994) (JSE) Risk adjusted Split Positive 
It is immediately noticeable from Figure 1 that all studies find positive returns in the 
pre-announcement period whether using the raw or risk adjusted measures. 
As to the cause of these returns Fama, Fischer, Jensen and Roll (1969) suggest that 
they arise in anticipation of the split. The problem with this suggestion is that these 
5 
returns are observed up to two and a half years prior to the event when it is doubtful 
that even management had decided to undertake a split. Consequently. unless the 
market is clairvoyant , such an explanation seems unlikely. (The problems wi th this 
suggestion are dealt with in more deta il in chapter 3. sect ion 4.1.) 
A more plausible explanation is that the pre-announcement returns are driven by 
growth in the splitting firm's earnings. Consistent with this explanation is evidence 
that the largest increases in returns and earnings coincide in the year immediately 
preceding the split (Lakonishok and Lev (1987)). This not only makes it unlikely that 
the split is the cause of the pre-announcement returns , but also suggests that the 
reverse may be true. Specifica ll y, that the split is caused by the pre-announcement 
@..lli[D~ as management uses Jhe s_plit to adjust th_e _share price to "normal" levels 
following a peri od of substantial equity appreciation . 
4. At announcement 
The announcement period falls immediately around the announcement date itself 
and differs from the pre-announcement period in that it is usually restricted to a 'few 
days. The results from studies of returns over this period are set out in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Findings on announcement returns 
Study Measure used Screened Share splits I Result 
dividends (returns) 
Grinblatt , Masulis and Mean adjusted Yes Both Positive 
Titman (1984) 
Lamoureux and Poon Risk adjusted Yes Split Pos itive 
(1984) (market model) 
Asquith . Healy and Palepu Market adjusted , Yes Split Positive 
(1989) risk ad~sted 
Biger and Page (1992) Risk adjusted, No Split Positive 
(JSE) market adjusted 
Maloney and Mulherin Raw No Split Positive 
(1 992) 
Again aJL studies are consistent and find that the split announcement is associated 
with positive returns . It is interesting that screening the sample for simultaneous 
events does not change this finding. Asquith , Healy and Palepu for example found 
that the full sample showed a mean market adjusted return of 3. 7% for the two days 
round the announcement (with 76% of the sample having positive returns) , while the 
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screened sample had a return of 4.4 % (with 78% of the sample having positive 
returns) . : 
The most common explanation advanced by the literature is that these 
a n un e-r2~~ etu:-:is are due t a :::11:s ·a . in expectations resulting from 
information conveyed by the split. This possibility is the subject of chapter 3, 
Information Based Models. 
5. At the ex-date 
The ex-date period falls immediately around the ex-date of a split and as with the 
announcement period is typically restricted to a few days. The results from studies 
covering this period are set out in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Findings on ex-date returns 
Study Measure used Screened Share splits Result 
I dividends (returns) 
Grinblatt, Masulis and Mean adjusted Yes Both Positive 
Titman (1984) 
Lamoureux and Poon Risk adjusted (market Yes Split Positive 
(1984) model) 
Asquith , Healy and Palepu Market adjusted, risk Yes Split Positive 
(1989) adjusted 
Biger and Page (1992) Risk adjusted, market No Split Not 
adjusted significant 
Maloney and Mulherin Raw No Split Positive 
(1992) 
Kryanowski and Zhang Market and risk Yes Split Positive 
(1993) adjusted 
Kryanowski and Zhang ARCH process (see Yes Split Not 
(1993) below) significant 
As can be seen in Figure 3, the group of studies around the ex-date generally show 
positive returns but contain two exceptions. 
The first relates to work done by Biger and Page on the JSE. Considering that they 
made use of a standard methodology the source of their different finding appears to 
lie in differences which exist between the JSE and U.S. markets . The only other 
study which was based on a non-U .S. market was by Kryanowski and Zhang but 
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even this s~udy found that positive returns accompanied the ex-qate when using a 
standard methodology. 
However, when Kryanowski and Zhang applied a different methodology they found 
methodology was evidence which they cited showing that the Ordinary Least 
Squares ("OLS") models, such as the market model which was used in their first 
result, were sensitive to the presence of heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity exists 
where the variance of the error terms in the OLS model is not constant. The result is 
that the OLS estimation process places more weight on the observations with larger 
error variances than on those with smaller error variances . Consequently, the 
variances of the estimated parameters are not the minimum variances. 
To compensate for this an alternative model , based on an Auto Regressive 
Conditional Heteroscedastic (ARCH) process , was used which allowed "the 
conditional variances of the market model error terms to change over time as a 
function of past error terms, the squared relative bid-ask spread and/or raw trading 
volume, and to change to a new regime on the split ex-dates" (page 79) . So by 
taking into account the effect on volatility of the increased bid-ask spread and trading 
volume following the split , they could determine whether there was a true increase in 
returns, or whether the observed increase was due to estimation problems. 
Their findings suggested that the ex-date return observed under the OLS models 
was due to a change in the share characteristics such as volatility and bid-ask 
spread. Of these the change in the bid-ask spread following a split has been 
identified by other studies as a possible source of the ex-date returns and is the 
subject of the following section . 
5.1. Microstructure effects 
The closing price , against which changes in returns are measured, is sampled from 
a distribution of possible closing prices. As the closing price typically falls within the 
bid-ask spread, the spread is often seen as a proxy for this distribution. The mean of 
this distribution (which is assumed to be equivalent to the mid-point of the spread) is 
seen as the equilibrium price and it is expected that the closing price will fall 
randomly around this price. It follows that a change in price and hence returns would 
occur when there is a shift in the entire distribution or spread over the measurement 
period. 
Yet returns m_ay also be observed under other circumstances. For e,xample, a return 
may be observed where the distribution becomes skewed causing the mean of the 
distribution to change i.e. the mean of the distribution changes but its median has 
remains constant. The return would then not be caused by a movement in the entire 
cii strioution c•J, y a cna ,ge in rile .: :1ape of tne is:r; fon . Ir. .:arr,; s c; ·r.a s;:;reac 
this may be seen as a clustering of. orders at either extreme of the spread possibly 
leading to an asymmetric widening of the spread towards either the bid or the ask 
quote. 
Such effects have been identified as the cause of the apparent arbitrage 
opportunities in options markets, and the year-end and day-of-the-week seasonality 
in share returns (Lease, Masulis and Page (1991 ), Phillips and Smith (1980) , Keim 
(1989), Porter (1989)) . These effects, caused by movements in and within the 
spread are referred to as microstructure effects. 
The importance of these effects is highlighted by Lease, Masulis and Page (1991) 
(page 1535) as follows: "Our analysis indicates that when systematic order flow 
imbalances are anticipated , due to institutional or regulatory influences, or due to 
sh ifts in aggregate demand or supply, average event day stock returns can be 
significantly biased. Also, when information releases trigger a preponderance of buy 
or sell orders, average stock reactions can be exaggerated by the effects of the bid-
ask spreads.". 
It appears from work done by Maloney and Mulerin (1992) that the returns observed 
at the ex-date may be due to similar effects. To establish whether this was the case 
they tested whether the closing prices congregated at the mid-point of the spread as 
was expected or whether they moved towards the ask quote, particularly around the 
ex-date. To do this they used an order flow balance or ratio calculated as follows : 
Closing Ask Quote - Closing Transaction Price 
Closing A_sk Quote - Closing Bid Quote 
For any given share, a ratio equal to zero would mean that the closing transaction 
price was at the closing ask quote. If the closing price was at the bid quote then the 
ratio would be equal to 1. When averaged across all firms it was expected that the 
ratio should be around 0.5, indicating that shares traded at the mid-point of the bid-
ask spread . 
.'he this was used for thei r sample of share splits they found that up until 20 days 
before execution the average order flow ratio was 0.511 (not significantly different 
from the expectation of 0.5) . However, from 1 O days before the ex-date the ratio 
dropped significantly indicating a relatively large number of trades near the ask 
quote. This lower ratio persisted for 20 days after the ex-date. This pr_ovided a clear 
indication that closing prices were clustering at the ask quote. 
Maloney and Mulerin then went further and examined the movements in the quotes 
They argued that if the bid and ask moved in tandem then the returns based on 
either quote should be similar. Any significant difference in the returns would indicate 
a change in the symmetry of the spread. 
They found that the movements in the two returns were similar across the 
announcement date. However, for the three days around the ex-date the return 
calculated on the ask quote was significantly higher (2% compared to only 0.6% for 
the bid), and persisted for 10 days afterwards. 
This indicated th::it the ex-date return was due to a widening of the spread which was 
probably due to an imbalance of orders. 
6. Summary 
A split is associated with positive returns . Yet it is important to identify that there are 
distinct sets of returns as each seems to relate to a different cause . The pre-
announcement return appears to be due to an increase in earnings following similar 
growth in the splitting firm 's industry. The returns observed at the announcement 
date appears to be due to information conveyed by the split , though the nature of 
this information is uncertain (the nature of this information is dealt with in more detail 
in the following chapter) . Finally, the returns at the ex-date appear to relate to 
microstructure effects relating to changes in and within the bid-ask spread. This is 
summarised in the following table. 
Figure 4: Summary of findings on changes in returns 
Period Return Probably attributable to 
Pre-announcement Positive Earnings growth which may be 
observed across the entire industry 
Announcement Positive Information conveyed by the split 
Ex-date Positive Microstructure effects 
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Chapter 3: Information based models 
1. Introduction 
The positive returns observed at the announcement of a share split are normally 
attributed to positive information which the split conveys. The difficulty is in 
identifying the nature of this information. 
It could be argued that a split conveys information concerning improved liquidity, 
which is consistent with management's stated motivation for undertaking a split 
(Baker and Gallagher (1980) , NYSE (1980)) . Yet most of the information based 
models discussed in this chapter have evolved in the light of evidence that liquidity 
actually worsens following a split, which implies that the announcement return must 
be related to other information (Copeland (1979) , Lamoureux and Poon (1987), 
Lakonishok and Lev (1987), Conroy, Harris and Benet (1990)) . 
This chapter will examine whether the announcement of a split carries information 
other than the potential improvement in liquidity. In doing so it will need to answer 
the following questions: 
does the split convey any information; 
is the information conveyed as a deliberate signal from management; 
what is the nature of the information; and 
can management adjust its level or intensity. 
2. The presence of information 
The first question concerns whether the split conveys any information . In order to 
recognise information it is necessary to understand how information impacts on the 
market, firstly at an investor level and then on the market in aggregate. 
When new information arrives an investor must evaluate: 
what courses of action he may take, and 
their likely outcomes. 
The range of likely outcomes constitutes the information structure or outcome 
probability distribution for that investor. This structure is not static, and the arrival of 
any new information, previously unincorporated by the investor, will cause it to 
change. A new structure is then formed which is a combination of the previous 
s,ruct ra an tile information rece ived, a:,d based on tnis the inves~or wi i act 
appropriately in order to maximise his expected utility. 
As the market is a collection of individual investors it may be assumed that the 
market's information structure is a composite of the information structures of all its 
individual investors. Therefore, if the arrival of information results in portfolio 
changes at an investor level, the effect of these changes may be recognised. at an 
aggregate level by the changes they bring about in the share's characteristics, such 
as its returns or trading volumes. 
This principle was applied by Beaver (1968) in developing two separate measures 
which he used to determine whether an event was informationally significant. These 
measures were the "Trading Volume Activity" ("TVA") and the share's "Security 
Return Variability" ("SRV") . 
The TVA measured the change in the relative trading volume around the event: 
"'ii. TVA= Number of shares of firm traded at a point in time (t) 
Number of shares of firm outstanding at a point in time (t) 
The SRV measured the change in abnormal returns around the event: 
::,... SRV= The abnormal return of that security at a point in time (t) 
The volatility of the returns in a non-announcement period (t-x) 
When applying these measures to earnings announcements, Beaver found that 
there was a dramatic increase in both the Trading Volume Activity (33%) and 
Security Return Variability (67%) during the announcement week, which he 
interpreted as confirming the presence of information. These results have been 
confirmed by other researchers including Foster (1981) and Firth (1981 ). 
Studies of share splits , in which these characteristics have been examined, have 
noted changes in both returns (chapter 2) and trading volumes (chapter 5). This 
evidence indicates that the split is an informational event, but provides no indication 
as to the nature of the information conveyed. 
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3. Deliberate and unintentional signal 
Given that information is conveyed the next question is whether management 
deliberately intended the split as a signal or whether the information was an 
·_; r ,i ;.L::iL r. 2. :· <:--:J:' .: • tr ~ s;:l't~:ng crocess. For a split to be a deliberate ~iQnal 
it would need to meet the following requirements (Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman 
(1984)) 
management must have a motivation to send the signal; 
management must have information to convey; and 
some barrier should prevent other firms from mimicking the signal and 
achieving the same positive results. 
As outlined in thP. introduction to this chapter the first requirement is the most difficult 
to satisfy as the surveys by Baker and Gallagher (1980) and the NYSE (1980) have 
shown that managers undertake splits to improve liquidity. Therefore, a signaling 
model where management undertakes a split for reasons other than liquidity 
contradicts this stated intention 1 . None of the signaling models addres~ this problem 
directly as they start from the premise, supported by empirical evidence, that liquidity 
actually worsens following the split. From here, the inevitable conclusion is drawn 
that the information conveyed cannot be concerned with improved liquidity. 
This represents a serious shortcoming in the deliberate signaling model but the 
remainder of this chapter will continue on the basis that a share split meets this 
requirement. 
The next requirement, concerning the existence of asymmetric information, may be 
more easily addressed. Asymmetric information may exist prior to the split as 
management is privy to company facts of the market is unaware of. Alternatively, the 
information conveyed may not necessarily be tangible but may concern 
management's beliefs which have not been previously communicated to the market. 
In both cases management would have information to impart to the market. 
1 This assumes that management's attitudes have not changed over the long period since 
these studies were conducted. Such a change may well have occurred , particularly in light of 
the contradictory evidence, discussed above, which showed that trading volumes declined 
following a split. In the absence of direct evidence to the contrary however, the findings of 
Baker and Gallagher's and the NYSE's studies are assumed to have remained valid . 
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The final requirement states that if the signal is being sent to elicit a positiv_e effect 
some barrier is needed to prevent other firms from mimicking the signal and gaining 
the same positive effect for themselves. In identifying this barrier, signaling models 
conveniently ooint to the evidence of lower post-split liquidity and argue that as 
positive information would willingly undertake a split (Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman 
(1984), McNichols and Dravid (1990)) . The problem once again is that this is 
contrary to management's stated intention. 
Alternatively, signaling models identify the barrier as management reputation 
(Heinke! (1984)) . This model holds that management relays information to the 
market based on their reputation and standing , which not only depends on their 
position in the organisation but also on the quality of the information they have 
relayed in the past. A false signal would risk their reputation and thereby lessen their 
ability to relay information in the future . 
Finally, the assumption that other firms would be able to mimic the signal ignores the 
fact that the market reaction depends not only on the signal but also on the market's 
pre-existing expectations. Where a signal is inappropriate in the context of these 
expectations a positive reaction would not result. In the case of a split, the 
appropriate expectations may be related to any number of characteristics, including 
the growth in earnings and returns in the pre-announcement period . If the positive 
returns at the announcement of a split are dependent on these characteristics , their 
absence would serve as a barrier preventing the signal from being mimicked by 
other firms. 
On these grounds, the relevant literature holds that the split is a deliberate signal. 
There do appear to be some problems with this view particularly regarding 
management's intentions, but these problems have so far not been addressed. 
Even if a split was to fail in terms of the requirements for a deliberate signal it is still 
possible that it may serve as an unintentional signal. This possibility could 
accommodate the problem of management's intention, as an unintentional signal 
would allow a dichotomy to exist between management's' intentions and the 
market's interpretation. For example, the market may interpret the split as a 
transaction which may, or may not, improve liquidity, but which management would 
only undertake if they felt confident about the firm's prospects. Management's 
confidence is conveyed through its choice of transaction and it is this choice which 
constitutes the signal. 
Another possibility is referred to as the attention hypothesis (Grinblatt , Masulis and 
Titman (1984)) . This holds that the announcement of a split increases interest in the 
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share. Assuming positive information had been previously unappreciated by the 
market, the increased interest could bring the information to the market's attention 
and prompt investors to reassess the share resulting in a positive revision in its 
price The S!)lit would then not introduce information into the market but instead 
v , "J L. • .: - le ,v c.<: ·,a-: ir.;C,i;lc~ion ·o be more widely appreciated. 
4. Nature of the information conveyed 
The third question concerns the nature of the information conveyed . This question 
will be answered by reviewing the relevant literature dealing with the signaling 
models themselves. In the main , these models view the split as a signal of either: 
increases in future or near term dividends; 
changes in earnings (either increases in future or near term earnings 
or the continuance of pre-split earnings) . 
4.1. Increases in future or near term dividends 
Fama, Fischer, Jensen and Roll (1969) were the first to introduce a signal ing model 
with regard to share splits. They proposed that the returns observed in the pre-
announcement period were due to revised expectations of near term dividend 
increases. 
Using data from 940 splits over the period from 1927 to 1959 they calculated the 
cumulative abnormal returns for 60 months around the split announcement date. 
This revealed a steady increase over the 30 months up to the split announcement, 
following which the cumulative abnormal returns remained constant. Fama, Fischer, 
Jensen and Roll interpreted this as showing that the growth in abnormal returns was 
in anticipation of the split, and so continued up to the point when the split was 
announced; hence, the abnormal returns were caused by the share split, or more 
particularly by the information it conveyed. 
They then linked the information conveyed to near term dividend increases. This link 
was established by dividing the splits into those which had experienced post-split 
dividend increases above the market average (71 .5% of the firms) . as opposed to 
those which had not. In the group where the post-split dividends were below the 
market average the pre-announcement abnormal returns reversed by the end of the 
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first post-split year, whereas the returns for the group with increases in dividends 
above those for the market did not. 
In effect, th is model rests on two premises: first , that there are significant increases 
::"' ~i·; idends f. !I wi g the split and second . that these are he cause of the abnormal 
pre-announcement returns. 
The first premise was confirmed in a later study by Lakonishok and Lev (1987). 
Using a sample of 1015 spl it events drawn over a 20 year period they matched each 
firm in the sample group with another firm of similar size which operated in the same 
industry. When they compared the dividend growth of the two groups they found that 
following the split: 
the growth in dividends in the post-split period tended to be 
significantly higher for the splitting group than for the control group 
(the splitting group outperforming the control group by 13.25% over 
the five years after the split) , and 
the largest increase in dividends for the splitting group was during the 
first quarter after the split where dividends increased by 7.4% 
compared to no growth for the control group. 
While this confirms the first premise, the second premise, linking these dividend 
increases to the pre-announcement abnormal returns , is more difficult to support. 
Fama, Fischer Jensen and Roll's test is indirect and merely shows that a firm 
experiences negative abnormal returns where its dividend growth is below that of the 
market. 
Their use of pre-announcement returns also raises a number of problems. Firstly, it 
seems unl ikely that the market would anticipate or assign value to an event two and 
a half years into the future . Secondly, the assumption that the spl it causes the pre-
announcement returns ignores the possibility that the split is the outcome of those 
returns i.e. management undertakes the split to adjust for the increase in the share 
price prior to the split. Thirdly, it ignores evidence that the pre-announcement returns 
are caused by increases in earnings (Lakonishok and Lev (1987), Asquith , Healy 
~ 
and Palepu (1989)) . These earnings are not firm specific and are observed across 
each firm's industry which again weighs against the possibility that the split has any 
causal role . 
While this excludes the pre-announcement returns , it is still possible that the 
announcement return itself may be related to near term dividend increases. This 
possibility however, has not found support in more recent studies of share splits . 
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Grinblatt, Masulis and Titm~m (1984) found that of a subsample of 176 share splits , 
where the firms did not pay a cash dividend in the three years prior to the split, only 
11 % initiated a cash dividend in the year after the split. These non dividend paying 
firms, however, still experienced abnormal announcement returns which led the 
authors to conclude that these returns could not be explained by forecasts of near 
term increases in dividends. 
Similar results were obtained by Asquith , Healy and Palepu (1989) . Of their sample 
of 121 non dividend paying firms only 40 initiated a dividend after the split and only 
11 of those within the first post-split year (which was a similar ratio to dividend 
initiations across the market as a whole) . Despite this , the pattern of returns was 
similar to that experienced by the dividend paying firms which again suggested that 
dividends were not the driving force behind the announcement returns . 
i) J \c.., \ 
} 
4.2. Changes in earnings 
\ 
As with increases in near term dividends, Lakonishok and Lev (1987) studied the 
pattern of earnings changes around the share split. Their findings can be 
summarised as follows: 
Before the split. 
Over the four years prior to the split both the median and mean 
earnings growth rates were significantly higher for the splitting group 
than for the control group. 
The difference between the growth rates widened closer to the 
announcement date from 5.8% four years prior to the split to 12.4% 
one year prior to the split. 
The mean growth rate for the splitting group was significantly higher 
than its median growth rate which suggested that the splitting group 
contained some exceptional performers . 
r 
I ( 
After the split. 
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The differential between growth rates persisted for the first year after 
the share split, though the differential was smaller than in the years 
the next three years (whereas the higher differential for dividend 
growth was significant). 
The difference between the mean and median growth rates 
disappeared by the second year after the split suggesting that the 
splitting group no longer contained any exceptional performers . 
This pattern of earnings was confirmed by Asquith , Healy and Palepu (1989) who 
determined that the mean earnings changes were significant and positive in the four 
years prior to the split with the largest increase occurring the year immediately prior 
to the split. After the split the earnings increased for the first year but then remained 
constant relative to the market. 
This pattern of earnings suggests two possibilities. First , the announcement return is 
related to the post-split increase in earnings. These increases may not be as large 
as the increases in pre-split earnings or post-split dividends, but they may not have 
been anticipated by the market and so could have informational value . Second, the 
announcement return is related to the larger increase in pre-split earnings, 
particularly in the year immediately prior to the split. 
4. 2. 1. Post-split earnings 
The possibility that the increase in post-split earnings was signaled by the split was 
investigated by Asquith, Healy and Palepu (1989) . They selected a sample of share 
splits, with split factors greater than 25%, covering the period from 1970 to 1980, 
excluding shares which had paid a cash dividend immediately prior to or at the 
announcement date. They then tested whether there was a cross-sectional 
relationship between the announcement returns, measured by the market adjusted 
return at the announcement date, and the change in post-spl it earnings using both 
the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients . 
This revealed that no relationship existed between the announcement return and the 
post-split earnings changes. Instead the correlation coefficients were only significant 
for the two years prior to the announcement suggesting that announcement returns 
were related to pre-split earnings. 
Different results however, were obtained by McNichols and Dravid (1990) who also 
examined the relationship be.tween the announcement return and future earnings. 
Whereas Asquith , Healy and Palepu (1989) found no correlation McNichols and 
Dravid found that the announcement returns and post-split earnings were correlated. 
The ciffarem res..:::s i:,rov1ced by tnesc s· JG es r.1ay be asc~ioea w ci number of 
methodological differences, including use by McNichols and Dravid of unexpected 
earnings (the change in raw earnings adjusted by the change in earnings predicted 
by market analysts), and the inclusion of both share splits and share dividends in 
their sample. 
McNichols and Dravid went on to concede that their evidence was weak and that it 
appeared that other attributes were also signaled by the split. Considering this and 
considering the contrary finding by Asquith , Healy and Palepu it appears that the 
future earnings model is at best incomplete. 
4.2.2. Pre-split earnings 
The second possibility is that the announcement return is linked to pre-split earnings . 
The problem with this possibility is that by definition a signal must convey 
information that is not known to the market which would seem to disqualify pre-split 
earnings. To solve this problem an assumption can be made that shareholders 
expect the pre-split earnings to reverse in which case the split could then serve as a 
signal contradicting this expectation . 
The assumption that investors expect earnings to reverse is based on findings from 
two separate sets of studies. The first shows that firms which undertake share splits 
experience large increases in earnings prior to the split (Lakonishok and Lev (1987) 
Asquith , Healy and Palepu (1989)). The second shows that large earnings increases 
tend to be transitory and are usually followed by large earnings decreases (Brooks 
and Buckmaster (1980), Beaver, Lambert and Morse (1980) and Freeman , Ohlson 
and Penman (1982)). 
Based on the assumption that the pre-split earnings will reverse Asquith , Healy and 
Palepu 's model proposed the following: 
firms experience above average earnings growth over a number of years 
which results in an increase in the share price as these earnings are 
capitalised. Because of the unusually large growth in earnings investors are 
uncertain as to their durability and discount them more heavily. Managers 
become aware of this and attempt to remedy the situation through a share 
split. The shareholders then interpret the split as a positive signal by . 
management and revise their expectations as to the durability of these 
earnings . 
whether: 
1. 
2. 
there was a positive relationship between the size of the 
announcement return and the size of the pre-split earnings increases, 
and 
the relation between the annual abnormal returns and the 
contemporaneous earnings changes was lower than normal in years 
prior to the split. In other words, the market does not incorporate 
changes in earnings to the same degree as it did in "normal" times. 
This rests on work done by Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver et al 
(1980) which indicated that there is a positive relationship between 
unexpected returns and contemporaneous earnings changes . 
The first point was confirmed by Asquith , Healy and Palepu (1989) who found a 
positive cross sectional relationship between the announcement return and earnings 
increases in the two years prior to the split using both the Pearson and Spearman 
correlation coefficients. This was also supported by the results of a regression of the 
announcement return against the earnings changes over the two years prior to the 
split wh ich showed that the regression coefficients were significant. 
The second point, concerning the decline in pre-split earnings elasticity, was testea 
by measuring the coefficient of the abnormal returns, calculated on a yearly basis by 
the excess of the firm's returns over a weighted market index, to earnings changes 
around the split announcement. In terms of their hypothesis, this coefficient should 
have been negative in years which experienced large earnings increases showing 
that these increases did not have as positive an effect on the share price as 
increases in normal years . Consistent with this they found that the coefficient was 
significantly positive in normal years while it was significantly negative in the two 
years prior to the announcement. 
Corroborating evidence was provided by Lakonishok and Lev (1987) who compared 
the price to earnings ratio ("P/E") for a sample of share splits to a control group. As 
with Asqu ith, Healy and Palepu 's test, a lower P/E in the years prior to the split 
would imply that the market was being more cautious in capitalising the splitting 
firm 's earn ings. Consistent with this they found that the average pre-split PIE for the 
spli tting group was 12.67 compared to 13.19 for the control group. This difference 
was significant but only at a level of 15% using a two-tailed t-test. After the share 
split the gap between the average P/E ratios disappeared suggesting that the market 
was no longer as cautious. 
that this model rests on the unproved assumption that investors hold negative 
expectations regarding the durability of earnings increases prior to the split. Although 
studies support the contention that large earnings increases are transitory, this does 
not necessarily mean that managers or investors hold this view. 
Furthermore, their suggestion that managers undertake the split to confirm the 
durability of earnings contradicts the findings , mentioned earlier, that the split is 
undertaken to improve liquidity. The evidence of declining earnings elasticity could 
also be interpreted by managers as characteristic of a decline in liquidity, thus 
prompting them to undertake the split for their stated reasons. Asquith , Healy and 
Palepu's evidence may therefore, equally support the liquidity model. 
5. Information and intensity 
In all of the models presented above managers are unable to adjust the intensity of 
the signal. The signal is the split announcement and once it occurs the share price 
adjusts by an inherently predetermined amount. In Asquith , Healy and Palepu's 
(1989) model for example, the adjustment is related to a pre-existing level of 
disbelief as to the sustainability of pre-split earnings: the more disbelief the greater 
the adjustment. There is no scope in such a model for managers to signal how 
confident they feel about the firm's prospects as their action is limited to a binary 
choice of whether to split or not. 
For managers to have control over their signal a more intricate model is needed, one 
which allows for an explicit signaling mechanism. This section will focus on the fourth 
question namely, how this mechanism could operate. 
5.1. Signaling equilibrium 
The only formal application of such a model was presented by McNichols and Dravid 
(1990) in which managers could adjust the intensity of their signal by changing the 
size of their split factor. They assumed that as trading costs were inversely related to 
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the share price2 , larger split factors would result in relatively higher costs for 
investors. They further assumed that managers and investors knew this , and so 
managers would only choose to impose these higher costs if they had more positive 
infor ation to convey. This trade-off would then allow investors to make inferences 
as to the strength of management's private information , and to respond 
appropriately. 
Stated more formally , the existence of an information/cost trade-off achieves a 
signaling equilibrium which McNichols and Dravid describe as follows : 
The level of the signal (the split factor) corresponds to the 
"unobservable attribute" (usually defined as future dividends or 
earnings) . 
Shareholders infer the level of the unobservable attribute from the 
level of the signal ( the split factor) . 
The combination of the two previous points results in the 
shareholders' beliefs corresponding to the level of the attribute. 
Unlike the other models discussed investors aren't responding directly to the 
unobservable attribute but rather to management's assessment of it. 
5. 1. 1. Evidence 
In order to support this equilibrium model McNichols and Dravid set about to 
measure its component parts and the relationship between them. 
First, the unobservable attribute was defined as the unexpected future earnings i.e . 
those earnings which had not been anticipated by the market and could therefore be 
2 Evidence discussed in chapter 5 shows that lower share prices are associated with wider 
bid-ask spreads. Consistent with this evidence shows that the bid-ask spread is relatively 
wider following a share split. Consequently , the assertion is made that a larger split factor 
leads to a relatively larger spread and hence a relatively higher liquidity cost. Other studies, 
also discussed in chapter 5, hold that direct trading costs such as brokerage commissions are 
lower as a percentage of the value traded for higher priced shares. A larger split factor, which 
causes a larger decrease in the absolute price of the share, wou ld therefore cause the relative 
size of these costs to increase. 
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signaled. These were calculated by subtracting the market analysts' forecasts of 
earnings from the actual earnings achieved after the split. 
Next, the level of the signal was defined as the unexplained split factor. They held 
size of the firm and its absolute share price. Only once these possible influences 
were removed could the unexplained split factor, which related to the unobservable 
attribute (the future earnings), be identified. 
5. 1. 2. Findings 
They found that the split factor was correlated with the unexpected earnings, 
implying that managers did adjust the split factor for private information concerning 
future earnings. They admitted though , that this evidence was weak as the other 
possible factors such as the size of the firm and its absolute share price were far 
stronger in explaining the choice of split factor. 
They then found a strong correlation between the signal (as measured by the 
unexplained split factor) and the abnormal announcement return . This was 
interpreted as showing that investors did base their revisions of firm value on the 
level of the signal provided by the unexplained split factor. 
Finally, they found that while the announcement return was correlated to unexpected 
future earnings it appeared that other attributes were also signaled . Consequently , 
the signaling explanation of the abnormal announcement returns was incomplete. 
5.2. Normal trading range 
Another possible signaling mechanism involves the concept of a normal or ideal 
trading range. In concept this model holds that managers use the split to return the 
share price to the normal range and send a signal by choosing where they place the 
post-split share price relative to the normal range. If managers expect above 
average growth it is assumed they would choose a price near the bottom of or below 
the normal range thereby allowing for this growth. Alternatively , if managers expect 
average growth it is assumed they would choose a price near the mid-point of the 
normal range. Investors would notice this and interpret the signal accordingly. 
The greatest difficulty is in actually defining the normal range for a share. At best it is 
a concept broadly understood by both managers and investors. It would be over 
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optimistic to assume that were able to distinguish where the normal range should be 
well enough to be able to adjust and interpret the strength of a signal based on it. 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter set out to answer the following questions as to whether a share split is 
a signal: 
does the split convey any information; 
is the information conveyed as a deliberate signal from management; 
what is the nature of the information; and 
can management adjust its level or intensity. 
In answer to the first question, it appears . from the literature, that a split does convey 
information. 
In answer to the second question, as to whether a split constitutes a deliberate 
signal of information other than liquidity, it seems unlikely as the split does not meet 
the requirement regarding management's motivation. Management undertakes the 
split to improve liquidity. The fact that a number of empirical studies have shown that 
liquidity worsens after a split cannot change this. 
In answer to the third question, it appears that if the split is a deliberate signal of 
information other than liquidity then the information conveyed concerns either future 
dividends or earnings (be they the increase in future earnings or the continuance of 
pre-split earnings). Of these, the continuance of pre-split earnings appears to have 
the strongest support. 
The answer to the fourth question remains uncertain as, in theory, it is possible for 
management to adjust the intensity of the information conveyed but this has so far 
remained unproved. Most models view the announcement return solely as an 
outcome of the market's existing expectations and do not allow for an adjustment to 
the intensity of the signal. 
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These questions and their answers are summarised in Figure 5 below. 
Figure 5: Summary of questions regarding information based models 
Does the split convey Yes 
any information 
Is the information No 
conveyed as a 
deliberate signal from 
management 
What is the nature of Pre-split 
the information earnings 
Can management Maybe 
adjust its level or 
intensity 
The announcement reaction is consistent with 
those observed at other informational events . 
For the split to be a deliberate signal 
management must have a motivation to send 
the signal , it must have information to convey 
and a barrier is needed to prevent other firms 
from mimicking the signal. Of these the split fails 
in that management's stated motivation is to 
improve liquidity and not to signal other 
information. 
The information could concern dividends or 
changes in pre or post-split earnings. It is 
difficult to prove these models as they attempt 
to infer the nature of information from the 
change in share characteristics such as returns 
or earnings elasticity. On balance though it 
would appear that the information would relate 
to pre-split increases in earnings. 
In theory it would be possible for management 
to adjust the intensity of the information. Given 
its intricate nature such a signaling mechanism 
is difficult to prove. 
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Chapter 4: Share splits and risk 
1. Jnr uci. 
As with returns, risk should be unaffected by a split as it has no impact on the firm's 
underlying operations and cash flows. Evidence however, suggests otherwise as 
measures of risk based on the volatility of share price returns consistently show 
significant increases after share splits. 
This chapter will start by examining the increase in volatility following a split, as 
documented in the relevant studies. It will then assess the evidence as to whether 
this represents a distortion in the measurement process or whether it represents a 
genuine increase in volatility. Assuming that there is a genuine increase in volatility it 
will attempt to determine its source. It will then consider the possible link between 
any genuine increase in volatility and the positive returns which accompany a split to 
determine whether they are related. Finally , it will examine the change in systematic 
risk following a split. 
2. Changes in volatility 
Ohlson and Penman (1984) found discrete increases in volatil ity at both the 
announcement and ex-date of a share split. The increase at the announcement, 
wh ile substantial , proved to be temporary and the volatility soon settled back to pre-
announcement levels . The increase at the ex-date on the other hand, proved more 
lasting and persisted for more than a year after the split. The authors were surprised 
at both the size and duration of the increase as the ex-date was not considered to 
be an informationally significant event. 
Th is pattern however, has been confirmed by other researchers including Dubofsky 
(1991) , Lamoureux and Poon (1987), Dravid (1987) , Sheikh (1989), Conroy, Harris 
and Benet (1990) , and Biger and Page (1992) . Of these, Dubofsky, Dravid and 
Sheikh followed Ohlson and Penman and used a cross sectional measure to track 
the volatil ity for each day across the split period and were thus able to confirm that 
there was a persistent increase in volatil ity on the ex-date. The others, including 
Biger and Page in South Africa, compared a period before and after the split, and so , 
wh ile they confirmed the increased volatility , they were unable to confirm whether 
there was a persistent increase and whether this increase occurred at the ex-date . 
2e 
In addition to these studies, which measured the change in volatility directly, Sheikh 
( 1989) used quoted call option prices and a standard call option pricing formula to 
calculate the implied standard deviations "ISD's". He then compared the ISD's for 
each share in his splitting sample to those for a control group to determine whether 
recognised this increase at the announcement or ex-date. As with findings from the 
direct measures of volatility he confirmed that there was a persistent increase in 
volatility and that this increase occurred on the ex-date. 
3. Causes of increased volatility 
Having established that there is an increase in volatility the next question concerns 
its cause. One possibility suggested by a number of researchers including Ohlson 
and Penman (1984) and Dubofsky (1991 ), is that the increase in measured volatility 
does not represent an actual change in risk but represents a distortion in the 
measurement process following the sudden change in the share price . Another 
possibility is that there is a genuine increase in volatility as the result of 
circumstances brought about by the share split. 
These two groups of possible sources of the increased volatility , while independent, 
are not mutually exclusive. The sources of the increased volatility may therefore be 
represented as follows: 
Increased Volatility Possible + Genuine increase 
measurement effects in volatility 
The next sections will examine these two groups of possibilities in more detail. 
4. Possible measurement effects 
The first possibility is that the increase in volatility is the outcome of measurement 
effects. Ohlson and Penman (1984) , who were the first to identify the increase in 
volatility following the ex-date, identified no less than seven potential statistical 
problems which may have distorted their results . These included the possibilities 
that: 
1. their results were distorted by a few outliers; 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
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their results were distorted by general secular trends and/or cyclical 
calendar time trends ; 
their z-statistic (used to measure the significance of their matched 
independence; 
volatilities were temporarily low in the period between the 
announcement and the ex-date ; 
the variances in the post-split period were temporarily high; 
the effect of the split on the volatility obscures an effect on the mean 
return; or 
their results were distorted by measurement effects relating to 
discreteness in price changes and possibly the bid-ask spread . 
Their subsequent tests led them to conclude that their findings were robust as 
regards all of these potential problems, except for the last where they conceded that 
measurement effects could have accounted for part of the increase in volatility . 
These effects are the subject of this section , which begins by identifying the nature 
of the possible measurement effects including the discreteness of price changes and 
the bid-ask spread , then examines the related literature to determine whether such 
measurement effects are present. 
4.1. Price changes 
The sensitivity of a share's volatility to the absolute price of the share rests on the 
assumption that a share changes price in discrete multiples or increments . An 
increase in volatility following a split could result if these increments did not fully 
adjust to the change in share price leaving them relatively higher. For example: a 
R10 share which changed price in increments of 10c (1 %) , would after a 10: 1 split , 
change price in increments of say 2c (2%) . The same information which would have 
resulted in a 1 % price change would then result in a 2% price change , which would 
be measured as an increase in volatility. 
It has been suggested that a similar effect may exaggerate volatility on the NYSE 
which trades in 8ths and not decimals (Ohlson and Penman (1984), Dubofsky 
(1991 )). This would particularly apply to lower priced shares where the difference in 
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the change increment ( 1.125c as opposed to 1 c on a decimal exchange) may be 
significant. 
4.2. Bid-ask spread 
The measurement of volatility may also be sensitive to the bid-ask spread which has 
been shown to widen following a split (Copeland (1979) , Conroy, Harris and Benet 
(1990) , Maloney and Mulerin (1992)) . 
Changes in price (and hence volatility) are not measured against the equilibrium or 
true price of a share but are instead measured against an estimate of the equilibrium 
price such as the closing price. The closing price is in turn sampled from a 
distribution with a variance which may be proxied by the bid-ask spread. As the 
spread widens the implication is that the variance of this distribution increases 
causing an increase in measured volatility . Had volatility been measured against the 
true or equilibrium price however, an increase in volatil ity might not have been 
observed. It is only the estimate of the equilibrium price (i.e. the closing price) which 
has become more volatile and consequently the observed increase in volatility does 
not represent a genuine increase in risk. 
4.3. Empirical evidence 
Considering the magnitude of the increase in volatility , Ohlson and Penman were 
skeptical that measurement effects were responsible . Furthermore, they considered 
that their use of the paired binomial test was conservative and should not have been 
distorted by such effects. Despite their skepticism they performed additional tests to 
determine whether such distortions were present. 
In the first of these tests they stratified their sample in terms of their post-split share 
price. They argued that as any measurement effects would be larger relative to the 
lower priced shares and so lower priced shares would include a higher proportion of 
shares with increased volatility . When they performed the test they found that this 
was not the case which suggested that measurement effects were not responsible 
for the increase in volatility . 
In the second of these tests they argued that any measurement effects should be 
more exaggerated over shorter measurement intervals such as a day, and less 
exaggerated over longer intervals. Therefore, if measurement effects were present, 
the volatility measured over daily intervals would exceed that measured over weekly 
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intervals. To test this they compared the results from their original test using daily 
intervals to results from weekly and monthly intervals. They found that the results 
were weaker when measured over the longer intervals but that they were still 
significant. Based o :·,~ results of this second test they conceded that 
measurerr,enr affec~s were prese I bw that hey did not provide a complete 
explanation for the increase in volatility . 
Dubofsky (1991) also examined the change in volatility following a split but started 
from the position that by comparing the results from AMEX and the NYSE he would 
be able to identify the factors which caused the increase in the post-spl it volatility . 
He suggested that if the different exchanges exhibited differing changes in volatility 
then the difference would be attributable to one or more of the following 
characteristics : 
Attributes of the share or company. Shares listed on AMEX tend to have 
lower share prices and market capitalisations than shares listed on the 
NYSE. These differences may influence volatility directly or through their link 
to trading volumes and the bid-ask spread. 
Specialist behaviour. The behaviour of specialists may be due to undefined 
structural factors or due to differing rules by which the exchanges operate. 
Ownership clientele factors . Trading on the NYSE is dominated by 
institutions while this is not so for AMEX. This together with differences in 
trading volumes and orders flows may also lead to differences in volatility . 
Using a methodology similar to that employed by Ohlson and Penman , Dubofsky 
found that there was an increase in daily return variance on AMEX but that this 
increase was smaller than that observed on the NYSE. Interestingly, he found that 
daily return variances on AMEX were higher than the NYSE both before and after 
the split. 
He then stratified his sample of AMEX shares by post-split share price and split 
factor to determine whether differences in share prices and split factors were 
responsible for the lower increase in volatil ity as compared to the NYSE. 
Comparisons of the strata showed that the increase in post-split volatility was still 
lower on AMEX even after controlling for the split factors and for the lower price 
levels. 
This test was then refined by the use of a multiple regression with the ratio of the 
mean post-split standard deviation to the mean pre-split standard deviation as the 
dependent variable. The independent variables included the exchange (NYSE or 
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AMEX), the split factor, the post-split share price and the size of the firm (as 
measured by market capitalisation) . He found that the post-split increase in volatility 
depended primarily on the exchange but that the market value of the firm and its 
post-split share price were also significant. From this he contended that as the latter 
possibility that such effects were present. 
As a final test he then repeated his initial procedure but based on weekly instead of 
daily variances. Similar to Ohlson and Penman, Dubofsky found that volatilities on 
the NYSE still showed a significant increase following the split when measured on a 
weekly basis. When the weekly measure was repeated on AMEX however, no 
increase was observed. From this he concluded: "measurement problems caused by 
the 1/8 effect and bid-ask spreads more fully explain the AMEX results , but the 
elements that make AMEX and NYSE different from each other prevent this 
conclusion being drawn for NYSE stocks." (Page 429) 
A similar conclusion was reached by Sheikh (1989) using implied standard 
deviations "ISD's" for each share. At the ex-date, the control group experienced a 
slight decrease in ISD's while those for the splitting group increased significantly. In 
addition , the increase in the level of ISD's for the splitting group was significantly 
correlated to the ex-date change in the standard deviations calculated from daily 
returns. However, the increase in ISD's was only 7,59%, lower than the increase in 
volatility as measured by the return standard deviations. Sheikh interpreted this as 
indicating that part of the increase in return volatility was due to measurement 
effects. 
4.4. Summary 
From this it appears that part of the ex-date volatility is due to measurement effects 
relating either to the discrete change in the share price or to the change in the bid-
ask spread following the split. In addition to the measurement effects there appears 
to be an increase in true volatility which needs to be explained. The relationship 
between these explanations is set out in Figure 6 overleaf. 
1 The bid-ask spread has been shown to be a function of the size of the firm and the share 
price (Conroy, Harris and Benet (1990)) . 
Figure 6: Increased volatility and measurement effects 
Increased Volatility Possible + Genuine increase 
measurement effects in volatility 
Change in share price 
Shares change price in set increments 
and these increments do not fully match 
Bid-ask spread 
Closing prices, against which the 
change in price (and hence volatility) 
are measured , are sampled from a 
distribution with a variance which is 
proxied by the bid-ask sp read . As the 
spread widens so the variance of thi s 
distribution increases resulting in an 
increase in measured vo lati lity 
changes in the share val ue, resulting in relatively 
larger incremental changes and higher 
volatility 
5. Information 
The bid-ask spread is ge nerall y 
wider for lower priced shares 
(Conroy, Harris and Benet ( 1990), 
Copeland ( 1979) Coler and Schaefer ( 1988)) 
Given that there is a genuine increase in volatility the question is how this increase 
comes about. One possibility concerns changes in information and the resultant 
change in expectations. 
Increased Volatility Possible + Genuine increase 
measurement effects in volatility 
Information Trading activity Noise traders 
The role of information was discussed in chapter 3 which focused on the relationship 
between information and returns . The focus in this chapter is on the relationship 
between information and the increase in volatility . In summary, an event may 
introduce information into the market in two ways : by conveying the information itself 
(internal information), or by increasing the amount of information available from other 
sources (external information) . 
5.1. Internal information 
As internal information is introduced by the split event it would logically have to 
reach the market on the announcement date. Consistent with this, a temporary 
. .,, -- -- - . -
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observed around other internal informational events (Beaver (1968)) . 
The increase on the. ex-date, on the other hand, should not be related to internal 
information as the terms of the split are known and once announced are rarely 
changed (Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman (1984)). Furthermore , whereas other 
significant informational events can result in persistent increases in volatility these 
increases usually decrease over time as the market assimilates the information and 
adjusts its expectations (Brown, Harlow and Tinic (1993)). The fact that the increase 
following the split ex-date shows no evidence of abating suggests that the increase 
may not be caused by internal information. 
5.2. External information 
External information differs from internal information as it is not conveyed by the split 
but is revealed indirectly through the increased interest which the split generates. A 
common , though loosely defined, version of an external information model is known 
as the attention hypothesis (Greenblatt, Masulis and Titman (1984)) . A more formal 
version , presented by Brennan and Hughes (1991 ), holds that a split presents 
brokers with a profit opportunity as brokerage commissions are relatively higher on 
lower priced shares (Copeland (1979), Coler and Schaefer (1988)) . They argued 
that following a split, brokers are able to maximise revenues by increasing the 
research available on a share in order to stimulate trading activity. Consistent with 
this they found that the number of analysts following a share increased following a 
share split. 
The problem with external information models is that the increase in awareness, and 
hence information should be gradual as it is not suddenly announced but instead 
filters through the market. Furthermore, the increase should begin at the1 
announcement when the first official knowledge of the split entered the market. The 0i · 
fact that the increase is discrete and not gradual , and that it occurs at the ex-date of 
a split and not at the announcement, weighs against the suggestion that the \ 
increase in volatility is due to an increase in external information . 
---
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6. Trading activity 
Increased Volatility Possible + Genuine increase 
measurement effects in volatility 
Information Trading activity Noise traders 
The next possible explanation for the genuine increase in volatility concerns a 
change in trading activity. Most studies conclude, when measuring activity, that there 
is a decrease in trading volume following a split which is consistent with the widening 
bid-ask spread. Other studies however, using absolute trading volume or the number 
of transactions as the measure, find the opposite and conclude that trading activity 
has increased. Lamoureux and Poon (1987) suggest that the increase in volatility is 
linked to those measures of trading activity that increase following the split -
specifically absolute trading volume and the number of transactions. This section will 
examine this suggestion in more detail. 
6.1. Models linking activity and volatility 
The link between volume and volatility was summarised by Karpov (1987) , who 
concluded that two empirical observations can be made: 
The correlation between trading volume and the absolute value of 
price changes is positive in both equity and futures markets i.e. large 
volumes are associated with large price changes. 
The correlation between trading volume and price changes is positive 
only in equity markets. This can be attributed to the fact that investors 
in equity markets are restricted by short sales constraints with respect 
to trading on negative information. Generally, price increases are 
associated with higher volumes and decreases with lower volumes. 
As Karpov (1987) concludes: 
"It is likely that observations of simultaneous large volumes and large price changes 
- either positive or negative - can be traced to common ties to information (as in the 
sequential arrival of information model), or their common ties to a directing process 
that can be interpreted as the flow of information (as in the mixture of distributions 
hypothesis) . And the relatively large cost of taking a short position provides an 
explanation for the observation that, in equity markets, the volume associated with a 
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price increase generally exceeds that with an equal price decrease, since costly 
. . 
short sales restrict some investors' abilities to trade 'on new information. This 
summarises much of what is known about the price-volume relation ." (Page 21) 
The following sections review the models men~ioiiec t y Kc:',:c11 r.arr:e:!y the 
sequential arrival of information model and the mixture of distributions hypothesis, to 
determine whether either could explain the increase in volatility following a share 
split. 
6. 1. 1. Sequential arrival of information model 
This model, developed by Copeland (1976) , is based on the assumption that 
information is given to one trader at a time. The reaction of that trader to the arrival 
of the information depends on whether the trader is classed as an optimist, a 
pessimist or as uninformed. If an optimist, the trader's demand curve will shift 
upwards by a specific amount, as opposed to a pessimist , who's demand curve will 
shift downwards. 
Further assumptions are made that uninformed traders cannot become informed by 
inferring information from the actions of others and that short sales are prohibited. 
This last assumption means that pessimists are less likely to react to the information 
and so trading volumes will be lower if generated by pessimists as opposed to 
optimists. 
As the information moves through the market both trading volume and the change in 
the share price will depend on the ratio of optimists, pessimists and uninformed 
traders and on the order in which the information is received . The next price change 
is a function of the previous price changes and the outlook of the trader receiving it 
next. Total volume is a random variable with an expected value equal to the 
weighted average of volumes under each possible path of dispersion. Volume and 
price aren't causally linked but are the outcome of the same process. 
Application to share splits 
The difficulty with this model is that it attributes the increased volatility to the flow of 
information, which as stated earlier, should remain unchanged over the ex-date of a 
split. It must be remembered however, that price changes in response to information 
do not only depend on the flow of information but also on existing expectations. 
These expectations are proxied in this model by the mix of optimists . pessimists and 
uninformed traders. Volatility may therefore, still increase, even where the flow of 
. . 
. . 
information remains constant, if there was a change in the mix of traders i.e . 
expectations. 
trader it may result in an influx of new traders, with substantially different 
expectations , resulting in a change to the overall mix. This change could then 
account for the increased volatility. As the increase in volatility occurs at the ex-date 
it suggests that the entry of new traders is prompted by the lower share price, which 
in turn suggests that the new traders may be smaller investors who are liberated by 
the reduction in odd-lot costs. If this is correct, then management's intention of 
improving liquidity for these smaller investors leads to an unforeseen increase in 
volatility. 
This explanation deviates somewhat from the sequential arrival of information 
model, but in doing so offers the insight that the increase in volatility may relate to a 
systematic change in expectations. 
6. 1. 2. Change in expectations 
The contention that the increase in volatility relates to a change in expectations rests 
on two assumptions: 
1. 
2. 
that there is an increase in trading activity by smaller investors 
following the split, and 
that these investors have systematically different expectations (and 
hence trading strategies) to the pre-split investors. 
The first assumption is logical and is consistent with management's stated 
motivation for undertaking the split . It is also consistent with the documented 
increase in the number of individual shareholders following the split (Maloney and 
Mulerin (1992)) . Furthermore, it is consistent with the changes observed in the 
different measures of trading activity , particularly the increase in the number of 
transactions while overall volumes remain constant or decrease (chapter 5) . 
Whilst the second assumption is more difficult to support there are reasons why 
smaller investors may have different expectations to larger investors. These could 
include: 
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Financial considerations such as taxes. In South Africa , for example, 
large institutional investors such as pension funds or life assurers are 
not taxed on trading profits whereas smaller individual investors are 
taxed i"' their activities are deemed to constitute s. esulative trading. 
T nese iffe .ng tax ru ies may produce differing trading strategies, and 
hence different responses to information. 
The size of the portfolios held. It is possible that a smaller investor 
would not have as diversified a portfolio as a larger investor. This may 
mean that some non-systematic risk is retained , which could result in 
different trading strategies. 
Different time horizons. It may be argued that larger investors , 
consisting of portfolio managers, are evaluated on their performance 
over a relatively short period , and so have short investment horizons. 
Smaller investors, unfettered by performance constraints, may have 
longer investment horizons. The sensitivity of portfol io choice to 
investment horizon was demonstrated by Marshall and Wynne (1992) 
who showed that an investor is less risk averse the longer his 
investment horizon. 
Speculative portfolios. Smaller investors may follow a dual strategy by 
investing a portion of their portfolio in a mutual fund while the 
remaining portion is held for speculative purposes. This is cons istent 
with a risk averse investor as the majority of funds are invested in a 
vehicle which provides with natural diversification (such as a mutual 
fund), the remaining portion is traded on their private bel iefs and 
information . 
Consequently, the smaller investors could have different expectations and ·follow 
different strategies to the larger investors. The influx of smaller investors could then 
lead to increased volatility in two ways. The first , is simply that the increase in the 
number of investors increases the possibility of a trade in response to the arrival of 
new information, particularly as the influx of new investors results in a wider spread 
of expectations and hence reasons to trade. Assuming transactions lead to changes 
in the share price, more transactions would mean more changes and hence an 
increase in volatility. 
The second, is that larger and smaller investors place different values on the share 
such that the prevailing price may not necessarily reflect the equilibrium value of the 
share to the other group of investors. Assuming the share price reflected a larger 
investor's value and information arriving in the market induced a smaller investor to 
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trade the resultant price change would reflect both the movement from the original 
larger investor's price to the original smaller investor's price and then from the 
original smaller investor's price to the new smaller investor's price. This double 
movement could result in an increase in volatility. 
In other words, the closing price is sampled from two separate distributions. These 
distFibutions have different means as a result of the differing expectations of the two 
groups of investors to which they relate. Consequently, the variance of the combined 
distributions is higher, resulting in increased volatility . 
6.1.3. Mixture of distributions hypothesis ("MOH'') 
The MOH holds that volatility is measured by price changes from one period to the 
next which , in turn , are sampled from distributions of possible price changes. The 
assumption is usually made that these distributions have a constant variance. In 
essence, the MOH disputes this and holds that the variances of these distributions 
are positively related to trading volumes. A consistent increase in trading volume 
would lead to a consistent increase in the variance of the distribution which would 
increase volatility . 
There are different versions of the MOH. One version holds that the variance of the 
price change for a single transaction is conditional on the volume of that transaction 
i. e. the larger the transaction the higher the possibility of a larger price change . 
Volume and price changes are then related on the level of the individual transaction 
and this is carried through to the period volatility . 
In another version , the period price change is the sum of the individual price 
changes with in that period. The variance of the price change distribution for a period 
is then related to the number of price changes within that period which may be 
approximated by the number of transactions. If the number of transactions remained 
constant then the Central Limit Theorem dictates that the individual period 
distributions would have a constant variance. If the number of transactions increased 
however, the variances of the distributions would increase and thereby increase 
volatility . This explanation is consistent with the increase in the number of 
transactions following the split (Maloney and Mulerin (1992)) . 
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7. Noise traders 
Increased Volatility Possible + Genuine increase 
measurement effects in volatility 
Information Trading activity Noise traders 
The final possibility, suggested in the literature, is that the genuine increase in 
volatility is due to the entry of noise traders into the market. This was suggested by 
Ohlson and Penman (1984) and was attributed to Black from private 
correspondence with him . In terms of this possibility the market is " ... populated by 
relatively ignorant individuals ('noisy traders ') who are interested in trading in low-
priced stocks rather than high priced stocks" (Page 265) . They would not necessarily 
be irrational but they would derive utility from the act of trading . This would increase 
the noise around lower priced shares ' returns resulting in the observed increase in 
volatil ity following a split. 
As a limited test of this they compared split adjusted trading volumes for 100 
randomly selected spl its . Then using a matched binomial procedure they calculated 
the proportion of cases where there was a change in trading volume immediately 
around the ex-date and found that there was no difference between the pre and 
post-split samples. Because there was little change in trading volumes immediately 
around the ex-date they suggested that this model had little value in explain ing the 
change in volat ility over the same period . 
This test however. may be flawed , as from the description of noise traders it would 
seem that such traders would mainly comprise smaller investors whose effect on 
overa ll volumes would be lim ited . The correct test would instead be to determine 
whether there was an increase in the number of transactions as the impact of 
smaller investors wou ld be more evident. 
Th is approach of identif;ing noise traders with smaller investors allows this 
possibility to be incorporated in the model formulated earlier in section 6.1.2 Change 
in expectations . This model is more fully developed and is preferable as it accounts 
for the apparent irrational i:; of these traders . 
\ 
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8. Causes of increased volatility- summary 
It appears that the change in volatility at the announcement date is due to internal 
information conveyed by the split and is consistent with other informational events 
The ex-date volatility , however, cannot be attributed to internal information as this 
information should already be in the market. It is also unlikely that the increase in 
volatility at the ex-date is the result of external information as an increase in external 
information should generate a gradual increase in volatility starting at the 
announcement date, which is not consistent with the observed change in volatility at 
the ex-date. 
The sequential arrival of information model does not provide a direct link between 
trading activity and volatility but instead attributes the increased volatility to a change 
in the mix of traders in the market. This may be interpreted as a change in 
expectations resulting from a change in the investors able to trade. The MOH on the 
other hand links the increase in volatility directly to the increase in trading activity - or 
more accurately, to the change in the number of transactions. Alternatively, the 
increase in volatility could be attributed to an influx of investors into the market who 
had previously been excluded from trading . These explanations are summarised in 
Figure 7. 
Figure 7: Causes of increases in true volatility 
Increased Volatility Possible + Genuine increase 
measurement effects in volatility 
Information Trading activity 
Sequential arrival 
of information 
model 
Mixture of distributions 
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investors 
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9. Volatility and value 
Whilst the models discussed in the previous sections attempted to explain the 
increased volatility around the split they did not attempt to link the positive ex-date 
will attempt to establish whether such a link exists. 
9.1. Measurement effects 
As discussed above, it appears that part of the increase in volatility following the ex-
date of a split is related to measurement effects caused by the widening of the bid-
ask spread. Similarly, a widening of the bid-ask spread was also identified in chapter \ 
2 as a possible cause of the ex-date return . The coincidence of these effects 
suggests a link between them. 
In terms of evidence presented by Maloney and Mulerin (1992) the ex-date return 
results from orders clustering at the ask quote following the split which widens the 
spread by skewing it upwards. The wider spread could in turn account for the 
persistent increase in volatility and would in this way link the return to part of the 
increased volatility . Consistent with this, evidence presented by Kryanowski and 
Zhang ( 1993) shows that the ex-date abnormal return is no longer significant once 
the effects of the increased spread and trading volumes are accounted for. 
Consequently, it appears that the ex-date return and part of the observed increase in 
volatility may be related. 
9.2. Tax-timing option 
It is also possible that there is a link between the abnormal return at the 
announcement of a split and the increased volatility following the ex-date. The only 
model to propose such a link was presented by Lamoureux and Poon (1987) , in 
which they suggested that the increased volatility had value as it presented investors 
with a tax timing option. 
The concept of a tax timing option was related to the structure of U.S. capital gains 
tax which taxed short term capital gains more heavily than long term capital gains. A 
more volatile share presented its owner with an option in that if the share price fell in 
the short term it could be used to offset a short term capital profit, while a gain could 
be deferred for the longer term. As this option has value its rec_ognition at the 
announcement date could produce the abnormal return . 
To test this they ran a number of regressions which related the change in the level of 
attempted to show that a relationship existed between the volatility and the abnormal 
returns (which, in terms of their model , represented the value derived from that 
increased volatility). Their findings confirmed the correlation , thus supporting their 
model. 
Subsequent evidence however, does not support this model. The model predicted 
that the introduction of the revised 1986 U.S. tax bill , which removed the distinction 
between short and long term capital gains, would lead to a decrease in the 
announcement return. Maloney and Mulerin (1992) , who were able to use data from 
years after 1986 specifically tested this hypothesis and were unable to support it. 
10. Systematic Risk 
The discussion in the preceding sections was restricted to volatility . This section 
examines the split's effect on systematic risk, generally measured by the correlation 
of changes in a share's returns to those of the market. 
Lamoureux and Poon (1987) were the first to measure the effect of a split on 
systematic risk by comparing the pre- and post-split Beta's (as measured using the 
market model). The pre-split Beta was measured over the 150 days ending 20 days 
prior to the announcement and the post-split Beta was measured over the 150 days 
beginning 20 days after the ex-date. 
Using the Chow test 39 of the 201 splits showed a significant increase in their Beta , 
while eight experienced a decrease. In addition , there was a significant increase in 
the average Beta across the split. These results were contrary to their expectations 
and so they conducted further tests by comparing their original Betas to Scholes-
William Betas to identify the presence of measurement problems caused by non-
synchronous or infrequent trading . They found that the Scholes-William Betas were 
similar to their original Betas which meant that the increases were not due to 
measurement problems. 
Similar results were obtained by Brennan and Copeland (1988) and Kryanowski and 
Zhang (1993). The periods used by Brennan and Copeland were more precise than 
those of Lamoureux and Poon as they calculated a Beta across three distinct 
periods i.e. the period before announcement, the period between announcement 
and the ex-dat~ and the period after the ex-date. When comparing the pre-
announcement Beta to the Beta measured between the announcement and ex-date 
they found that there was no significant change. When comparing Beta 's across the 
ex-date however, they found that there was a significant change 
They extended the study by examining the time series behaviour of the average 
Beta across the split event using a cross sectional measure. They found that there 
was a tendency for the average Beta to increase temporarily on the day before and 
on the day of the announcement itself. However, another larger increase was 
observed at the ex-date which persisted for the next 300 days. 
10.1. Systematic risk and volatility 
As these results are not consistent with the received theory . which holds that 
systematic risk should not change in response to a firm specific event further 
analysis is needed, particularly with regard to the role which volatility plays in the 
Beta measure of systematic risk. 
If volatility for a particular share increases following the ex-date of the split, and the 
volatility of the market remains constant (as it should not be affected by firm specific 
events) then the Beta measure should increase. This can be seen in the formula to 
calculate Beta: 
The covariance of the share's return with the market return 
The variance of the market return 
As Kryanowski and Zhang (1993) state: "The post-split increase in Beta can be 
attributed to change in at least one of the three factors: the variance of the market, 
the variance of the splitting stock, and the correlation (or covariance) between the 
returns on the spl itting stock and the market" (Page 60) . 
As the split is a firm specific event there is no reason for the market's standard 
deviation (and hence variance) to change . Kryanowski and Zhang confirmed this by 
comparing the Toronto Stock Exchange's 300 Composite index before and after 100 
split ex-dates. 
The covariance of the share's returns with those of the market was also investigated 
by Kryanowski and Zhang who compared both the covariance and correlation 
coefficients (being the relative measure) between the pre and post-split periods . For 
the covariance measure, they found that the mean increased by 50% but was only 
significant at a 10% level as was the Wilcoxon test. The sign test however, was not 
significant. The difference between the correlation coefficients , on the _other hand, 
was not significant under any of the tests. From this they concluded that: "Thus, for 
this sample, the post-split increase in the mean covariance and Beta on the si,lit ex-
date is attributable to the increase in the mean (residual) variance of the splitting 
:ocKs ' ,Fagc ~ ~, - -~ 313tcrn a:ic nsk is cc fi r1&c by tile co11eiarion between 1he 
movements in the share and the market, then it may be argued that there is no 
change in systematic risk following a split. 
10.2. Summary 
The Beta measure of systematic risk has three components , namely the return 
volatility of the particular share, the volatility of the market return and the covariance 
of the share's return with that of the market. An increase in the share's volatility while 
the other components remained constant would lead to an increase in the measured 
Beta. This then does not represent an increase in systematic risk as the increase is 
solely driven by the particular share's volatility with no change in the covariance of 
the share and market returns . 
11. Overall Summary 
This chapter set out to examine a number of issues relating to the change in volatility 
and systematic risk around share splits by means of a review of the related 
literature. These issues are summarised below. 
Issue Answer Comment 
Is there an increase in Yes Surprisingly, the most significant increase occurs at the ex-
volatility following a split? date of a split and not at its announcement. Furthermore, 
the increase in volatility at the ex-date persists for a 
considerable period without abating . 
Issue Answer 
Is the increase due to a Both 
distortion in the 
measuremenc precess or is 
there a genuine increase in 
volatility? 
What drives the genuine 
increase in volatility . 
Is there any link between the Yes 
increase in volatility and the 
positive returns observed 
around the ex-date of a split 
Is there an increase in No 
systematic risk following the 
split 
Comment 
It appears that part of the increase in volatility at the ex-
d2'.e is due to distortions caused by the widening o: the 
bic-3sk spreac and by the discrete change in the price of 
the share following the split. Whilst these measurement 
effects are present, they cannot account for the entire 
increase in volatility which suggests that there is also a 
genuine increase in risk. 
Three possible causes were identified including : 
- an increase in the amount of information on the share 
available following the split; 
- an increase in trading activity; 
- an influx of "different" traders following the split with 
different expectations. 
It appears that the increase in volatility observed at the 
announcement of a split may be attributed to information 
conveyed by the announcement. The increase at the ex-
date however, does not appear to be related to information 
but instead may be related to the increase in trading 
activity and influx of "different" investors. 
It appears that the ex-date return and part of the increase 
in volatility may be attributed to the widening of the bid-ask 
spread. 
There is an increase in the traditional measure of 
systematic risk, the Beta, following the split. The increase 
in the Beta though, appears to be solely due to the 
increase in the splitting share's volatility . Other 
components of the Beta measure such as the covariance 
of the share's return with the market return and the volatil ity 
of the market return itself remain unchanged. This 
suggests that the share's systematic risk has remained 
unchanged. 
Chapter 5: Liquidity 
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Market folklore holds that improved liquidity, defined in terms of the size of 
shareholder base or the level of trading activity, is responsible for the positive 
returns observed around share splits. While this appears to be a reasonable 
proposition it is not supported by research which demonstrates that liquidity 
decreases following a split. It is along this divide, resulting primarily from differing 
bases of analysis, that market opinion and academic evidence have traditionally 
been at odds. These contrary positions regarding liquidity are the focus of this 
chapter. 
The question of liquidity is important as it serves as the deciding factor between two 
opposing views as to the cause of the returns observed around the announcement 
of a share split. If liquidity improves, it supports the common view that the returns 
are driven by the improvements in liquidity. If liquidity worsens , then the returns 
cannot be driven by improved liquidity and must instead be driven by other positive 
information. 
In this chapter, the literature relating to changes in liquidity around a share split is 
reviewed, commencing with an examination of the views held by market participants 
and the evidence of an increased shareholder base. The concept of liquidity is then 
analysed and the literature concerning empirical tests of liquidity around the share 
split is reviewed , looking specifically at trading activity, bid-ask spreads , direct 
trading costs and odd-lots. Finally, the normal trading range model of share splits is 
examined. 
1.1. Market folklore and surveys of market participants 
The common view concerning liquidity was confirmed in two separate studies, 
undertaken around the same time, which focused on the attitudes of market 
participants to share splits. One, by Baker and Gallagher (1980) , examined 
management's motivation to undertake a split, while the other, by the research 
department of the NYSE (1980) , extended beyond managers to individual and 
institutional investors. 
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The findings of these studies regarding management's attitudes were simil_ar and 
can be summarised by Baker and Gallagher's comment, " .. . the statement showing 
the highest percentage of agreement indicates that stock splits make it easier for 
small stockholder" +0 purchase round lots. Managers also believe that stock splits 
1<.:Sc;J a fi,m s s:0cK price at a,-1 op(;ma! piice ,ange a,1c ir.ciease the numoer of 
shareholders in the firm . Finally they felt that , by increasing the number of shares 
outstanding , stock splits make stocks more attractive to investors." (Page 74) 
They continue later: 'These responses seem to indicate that in making stock split 
decisions managers are more concerned with small investors than with institutional 
investors. That is, stock splits provide a means of reducing the stock's market price , 
thereby making it more appealing to small investors. This notion is linked to the 
commonly-held belief that high-priced stocks are not as popular with individual 
investors and that these stocks tend to have a more restricted market. By reducing a 
stock's price through a split, managers seem to think that a firm can increase 
marketability and increase the ownership base." (Page 7 4) 
These views were echoed in the results of the NYSE survey of small individual 
investors whose opinions can be summarised by the following statements which had 
the highest percentage of agreement amongst the respondents : 
When a stock splits, the price per share gives you a better chance to 
invest in that stock. (82.1 % agree) . 
An issue is more active after a stock split. (80.8% agree) . 
Stocks that split represent an investment opportunity for me. (77 .0% 
agree) . 
Furthermore, 90% of the respondents stated that they would retain , or increase, their 
holding of a share that underwent a share split. 
Institutional investors, represented by portfolio managers and traders , did not have 
as positive a view. To them the split was a non-event which did not affect them 
beyond any simultaneous dividend announcement. However, despite the fact that 
they attached no importance to it, both the managers and traders noted that there 
was increased trading activity after the split . 
Based on this evidence there appears to be consensus amongst the market 
participants that liquidity is positively affected by a split , yet this view is not 
supported by any empirical studies of liquidity . The reason for this . at least in part , 
appears to lie in differences in the definition and measurement of liquidity. 
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2. Components and measures of liquidity 
with little change in price from the price prevaii ing in the previous transaction. 
Liquidity may be expressed in terms of cost, as the value which must be foregone or 
the discount given in order to sell it quickly. Or it may be expressed in terms of time, 
as the delay required before the security may be sold without a discount. 
Market liquidity may be separated into a number of components. These normally 
include market depth, breadth and resilience. A market has depth where orders exist 
both above and below the price level at which the security is currently trading . It has 
breadth where the orders exist in large volumes and it has resilience where price 
changes caused by order imbalances are immediately compensated for by 
increases in orders. These components in turn may be proxied by surrogate 
measures including trading volumes and the bid-ask spread (Reilly 1994). 
Trading volumes are typically measured either by the number of shares or by the 
value of the shares traded . Whichever measure is used the assumption is being 
made that it is easier to effect a trade where there are higher volumes and thus 
higher volumes are indicative of higher liquidity. The value traded has the advantage 
over the number shares traded of not needing to be adjusted for the split-factor 
following a share split. It also has an advantage in that the bid-ask spread has been 
shown to be inversely related to the value traded and so provides a link between the 
two measures of liquidity. 
The bid-ask spread is the gap between the quoted prices for buyers and sellers of a 
security at any point in time. The exact nature of the spread depends on the market. 
The NYSE for instance, has dealers who quote their selling and buying prices for a 
security which become the bid and offer quotes respectively . In this type of market 
the spread is set by the market makers based on factors such as holding costs , 
perceived risk and demand for the share. Other markets match buy and sell orders 
automatically in which case the spread represents the difference between the 
highest seller's and lowest buyer's price at a point in time- in other words the spread 
is not set by a third party but is a direct outcome of market forces . The assumption is 
being made that, in both markets, a consistently lower spread results from there 
being a larger number of ready buyers and sellers , which is indicative of liquidity. 
Trading volumes and the bid-ask spread may in turn be proxied by other measures 
such as the market capitalisation of the firm or its number of shareholders . Both of 
these measures provide an indication of how readily a buyer or seller for that firm 's 
securities may be found. · Finally, as liquidity represents the cost or discount in 
realising a security, consideration must be given to the direct costs of transacting 
such as brokerage commissions and taxes . 
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and so are used interchangeably. In the case of a split however, this consistent 
behaviour appears to break down. This reflects both the nature of the event and the 
fact that while the measures may on average behave consistently over a period of 
time they may not necessarily do so around a specific event. These problems are 
examined in the following sections. 
3. Change in the number of shareholders 
An indication of liquidity is provided by the number of shareholders. Market folklore 
holds that a split improves liquidity by enabling smaller investors to buy and sell the 
share more easily which is then reflected in an increase in the number of 
shareholders. For this argument to be valid the following questions need to be 
answered: 
is there an increase in the number of shareholders ; 
is this increase due to the split; and 
does this increase represent an improvement in liquidity? 
An increase in the number of shareholders following a share split has been 
confirmed in a number of studies as can be seen in Figure 8. 
Figure 8: Findings regarding the change in the number of shareholders following a split 
Increase in average number of shareholders 
Study Splitting group Control group 
Barker (1956) 30% 6% 
Lamoureux and Poon (1987) 34.65% -1 .92% 
Maloney and Mulerin (1992) 23.4% N/A 
Maloney and Mulerin extended this analysis and determined that the average 
number of individual shareholders increased from 6 817 before the split to 8 288 
afterwards. They also found that there was an increase in the average number of 
•.-
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institutional shareholders from 32 to 55, and an increase in their average percentage 
holdings from 23.8% to 31 .2%. 
That this increase in the number of shareholders may be attributed to the split is 
over the split period as are changes in trading volumes or returns . It is therefore, 
possible that another factor, such as pre-split equity appreciation , could be the 
cause of the increased number of shareholders. This possibility is consistent with the 
documented increase in the numbers and holdings of institutional investors who, by 
definition, should be unaffected by changes in odd-lot costs following a split. If these 
increases in their holdings are not being driven by odd-lot costs then these increases 
must then be driven by another factor. It logically follows that this other factor could 
then also be responsible for the increase in the number of smaller investors. 
The answer to the third question, as to whether this increase in the number of 
shareholders represents an improvement in liquidity, is also uncertain. Firstly , the 
question is circuitous: is improved liquidity evidenced by an increased number of 
shareholders or is the increased number of shareholders the source ot the improved 
liquidity? 
Secondly, assuming that shareholders primarily trade in round lots , the number of 
shareholders may increase as each shareholder has more round lots to sell 
following a split. This increases the possibility that the original holding will be spread 
among more shareholders following the split. If this is the case, then the expansion 
of the shareholder base is a mechanistic outcome of the trading process and is not 
necessarily indicative of improved liquidity, i.e. the same amount of trade occurs but 
through more people. Finally, while there may be an increase in the number of 
smaller shareholders this may not necessarily improve the liquidity of larger 
shareholders as the volumes traded may be too small. 
So while there is an increase in the number of shareholders following a split the 
arguments presented above suggest that it is neither certain that the increase is 
caused by the split nor that the increase is indicative of improved liquidity, 
particularly for larger investors. 
4. Changes in trading volume around the share split 
Trading volume is often measured by the number of shares traded , which is also 
known as absolute trading volume. Absolute trading volume is sensitive to a split as 
a split increases the number of shares in issue which automatically increases the 
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measured volumes. To compensate for this , the pre or post-split volumes may be 
adjusted by the split factor to provide what is known as adjusted trading volume. 
Alternatively , trading volume may be measured against the number of shares in 
automatically adjusted by the split this measure provides a comparable measure 
across the pre and post-split periods. Lastly, trading volume may also be measured 
by the value of the shares traded which is known as the value traded or value based 
trading volume. As with relative trading volume, this measure does not need to be 
adjusted for the effects of a split. 
The following sections will briefly summarise the methodologies and findings of 
studies on trading volumes around share splits before attempting to compare and 
draw conclusions from their results . 
4.1. Studies on trading volume 
4.1.1. Copeland (1979) 
Copeland used a finite time series model to determine whether there was any 
change in the relative trading volumes for a sample of 25 shares following a split. 
The results did not provide strong evidence but did suggest there was a change . 
To investigate this further Copeland formulated a measure of abnormal trading 
volume by comparing the actual volume for a share against the predicted volume in 
terms of a finite time series model after adjusting for the split factor and for the 
number of trading days per week. The results were then measured as cumulative 
residuals (being the cumulative difference between the actual and predicted volume) 
across the split ex-date. This revealed persistent negative res iduals starting before 
the ex-date indicating a decrease in the split adjusted trading volume. 
4.1.2. Lamoureux and Poon (1987) 
Following Copeland's (1979) work, Lamoureux and Poon measured daily split 
adjusted and absolute trading volumes over a period 60 days before and 100 days 
after the split ex-date for a sample of 215 shares . Both the absolute and split 
adjusted volumes were normalised by the market volume to counter the general 
increase in trading volumes over the long period from which their sample was drawn 
(1962 to 1985). 
Consistent with Copeland's findings they noted that the mean split adjusted volume 
declined after the ex-date with 87 of the 215 shares showing a significant decrease 
while only 27 exhibited a significant increase. As expected , the absolute trading 
volume increased after the share solit. 
4.1.3. Lakonishok and Lev (1987) 
Lakonishok and Lev compared relative monthly trading volumes measured around a 
gr:oup of share splits to similar measures for a control group. This revealed an 
increase in the average trading volumes for the splitting group, above that for the 
control group, starting from about a year before the month of the split 
announcement. Up until that point the average volumes of the two groups had been 
similar. 
The difference increased closer to the split and peaked in the announcement month 
when the average monthly turnover was 5.4% for the splitting group as compared to 
4.1 % for the control group. The difference then disappeared by the second month 
following the announcement. 
4.1.4. Conroy, Harris and Benet (1990) 
Conroy, Harris and Benet compared trading volumes, for a sample of 147 share 
splits from 1981 to 1983, to a random sample of shares. The comparison was made 
of trading volumes during the two months preceding the month of split 
announcement against the two months following the month of the ex-date. This 
comparison was repeated for each share and each measure of trading volume 
(absolute, relative , split-adjusted, and value based) . 
They found that prior to the split the splitting sample had significantly lower absolute 
trading volumes than the random sample of shares . After the split the absolute 
volumes of the splitting sample increased but were still lower, on average, than the 
random sample. 
The splitting shares were also lower in terms of relative volumes prior to the split 
(though this difference was not significant). Unlike absolute volumes, there was no 
increase in relative volumes following the split. Similarly, they found that there was 
no significant change in the value of shares traded. 
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While these measures showed that there was no change, they did find a significant 
decrease in split adjusted volumes following the split. This finding however, seems 
strange, as the relative measure is equivalent to the split adjusted measure except 
that its denominator is multiplied by the number of shares in issue prior to the split. 
post-split period is the split factor, and hence it is equivalent to the split adjusted 
measure and should provide the same result. 
4.1.5. Maloney and Mu/erin (1992) 
Maloney and Mulerin used a sample which included all share splits on NASDAQ 
between 1985 and 1989 excluding multiple splits. Their period of study was long 
and covered the period from 500 days before the split ex-date to 500 days 
afterwards. The change in trading volume was measured by the change in the total 
value traded over this period . 
They found that there was an increase in value traded starting aro!Jnd 200 days 
before the split ex-date. This increase was due to an increase in the number of 
shares traded and to an increase in the average share price over the same period. 
After the split, the value traded stabilised. This stabilised volume represented a 
decrease from the volume prevailing less than 100 days prior to the split , but was 
higher than the average volume over the 400 days prior to this. 
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4.2. Summary of the studies 
The results of these studies are summarised in Figure 9. 
Figure 9: S ·mm . , f f the :!-:,r,qes h t,ading volume 
Measure 
Absolute 
Relative 
Split adjusted 
Value 
Study Period of study (prior Change in volume 
to the split) (after the split) 
Lamoureux and Poon 60 days Increase 
Conroy, Harris and 2 months prior to the 1 Increase 
Benet 
Lakonishok and Lev 
month prior to the split 
announcement 
5 years 
observed 
months) 
(change Decrease 
from 8 
Conroy, Harris and 2 months prior to the 1 No significant change 
Benet month prior to the split 
announcement 
Lamoureux and Poon 60 days Decrease 
Conroy, Harris and 2 months prior to the 1 Decrease 
Benet month prior to the split 
announcement 
Copeland 336 days Decrease 
Conroy, Harris and 2 months prior to the 1 No significant change 
Benet month prior to the split 
announcement 
Maloney and Mulerin 500 days Long term- increase 
Short term- decrease 
Th is table shows that most studies find that trading volume either decreases or 
experiences no significant change. The measures which do show an increase either 
concern absolute volumes, which are expected to increase given the increase in the 
number of shares in issue, or they concern the value of the shares traded , which is 
influenced by a documented increase in the share price immediately prior to the split 
(Maloney and Mulerin (1992)) . 
A further observation is that the change in volume is sensitive to the period over 
which the change is measured. This is particularly apparent in the finding by 
Maloney and Mulerin that value based volume decreases when measured over the 
short term but increases when measured over the longer term . This effect may also 
be seen in the findings of Lakonishok and Lev (1987) who observed that the largest 
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increase in volumes in their test group occurred from eight to twelve months prior to 
the announcement. The volumes then returned to the level of the control group two 
months after the announcement which was approximately when the ex-date 
_ccurred P,s tr~'' c:r:clude: "Clearly . compared to the peak volume during the eight 
to twelve months preceding tne split announcement, the pos1-c,nnouncement volume 
is lower. However, this peak volume is obviously abnormal for the splitting firms, 
reflecting their unusual operational performance .. .. ". (Page 930) 
The possibility that the pre-split volume is abnormally high was acknowledged by 
Copeland (1979) in the conclusion to his paper: "That brokerage fees and bid-ask 
spreads are higher after splits is consistent with abnormally favorable pre-split 
liquidity followed by normal post-split liquidity .. . " (Page 138) 
If the pre-split volumes are abnormally high then any study which compares these 
volumes to the volumes following the split is likely to find that there is a decrease. If 
the period of study immediately prior to the split is extended, then a conclusion that 
there has been no change in volume becomes more likely. This does not alter the 
fact that there has been a decrease in trading volume but it raises the question as to 
whether this decrease was caused by the split. If the high pre-split trading volumes 
would have declined naturally, then the decline observed in the above studies 
cannot necessarily be attributed to the intervention of the split. 
This is difficult to prove as there is no direct evidence available . On an indirect basis , 
it may be argued that the pre-split volumes are related to the pre-split equity 
appreciation which, as with volumes, accelerates closer to the split date (Lakonishok 
and Lev (1987), Karpof (1987)). The question of whether the high pre-split volumes 
may have persisted may then be rephrased by asking whether the simultaneous 
equity appreciation could have persisted. On this basis the answer appears to be no, 
as the equity appreciation appears to be driven by earnings growth across the 
splitting firm 's industry (Asquith , Healy and Palepu (1989)) , which means that the 
firm 's growth in earnings would continue only as long as its industry's growth 
continued , and would decline as earnings growth in its industry declined . 
From this , it seems that the split is therefore not responsible for the decl ine in trading 
volumes . Yet, even if this indirect evidence is applicable, and the pre-split volumes 
were abnormal and would have returned to lower levels over time, the fact remains 
that volumes are generally lower following a split. At minimum the split seems to 
precipitate the decline in trading volumes. 
Finally, care needs to be taken as the split may itself be the result of the increases in 
trading volumes and equity prices. If the share split tends to coincide with the point 
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at which these increases end, then the finding of decreased volumes would not so 
much comment on the result of the split as much as its cause. 
4.3. Summary 
On the whole volumes appear to be lower or, at best, unchanged following the split. 
Apart from absolute trading volume (which is affected by the increase in the number 
of shares in issue), and value based volume over the longer term (which is affected 
by the general increase in the share price) , no measure shows an increase. The 
conclusion that volumes decrease must however take into account that volumes 
appear to be abnormally high immediately prior to the split and that the measured 
decrease may then represent a natural adjustment to normal levels. 
4.4. Number of transactions and the average number of shares per transaction 
Trading volume is a product of the number of transactions and the average number 
of shares or value per transaction. Normally no consideration is given to these 
components of trading volume as they are incorporated into the overall measure. 
However, where an event intervenes resulting in a change in trading volume it is 
instructive to understand how this change comes about. 
The only empirical evidence on U.S. markets regarding the change in the number of 
transactions appears in a study by Maloney and Mulerin (1992) who found that there 
was a marked increase in the number of transactions following the ex-date of a split. 
This was confirmed on the JSE by Manan and Uliana (1994). Lamoureux and Poon 
(1987) also reached the same conclusion on the NYSE but this was based on the 
assumption that an increase in the number of transactions is an automatic outcome 
of the significant increase in the number of shareholders. 
There is no empirical evidence regarding the change in the average number of 
shares per transaction following a split. Maloney and Mulerin (1992) suggest that, as 
the overall volumes remained constant or decreased slightly and the number of 
transactions increased, there must be a decrease in the average number of shares 
per transaction . While this is a simple mathematical relationship the conclusion 
regarding liquidity needs more careful consideration. 
If the decrease in the average number of shares per transaction is caused by 
investors trading in smaller blocks of shares then the conclusion that the split has 
had a negative effect on liquidity (as overall volumes are lower) ignores the fact that 
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the decline is the outcome of investors choosing to trade in smaller blocks of shares. 
The fact that a choice is involved suggests that there must be value attached to the 
choice which outweighs any additional costs imposed by the decrease in overall 
Similarly, if the decrease in the average number of shares per transaction is the 
result of an increase in the number of transactions by smaller investors then the 
conclusion that there is a decrease in liquidity needs to be revisited . Assuming the 
effect of smaller investors on overall volumes is limited, an increase in the number of 
smaller investors would increase the number of transactions without a corresponding • 
increase in overall volumes . This would then be observed as a decrease in the 
average number of shares per transaction . While a decrease in overall volumes 
would suggest an adverse affect on the liquidity of larger investors it equally 
suggests a positive effect on smaller investors. 
Both scenarios outlined above, explain the decrease in overall trad ing volumes but 
suggest some corresponding gain, the first relating to the market in general and the 
second relating specifically to smaller investors. Any conclusion rega_rding liquidity, 
when based on the decline in trading volumes , needs to take these corresponding 
gains into account. 
4.5. Summary 
The use of different measures of trading volume and different measurement periods 
has resulted in some confusion regarding the change in trading volume around a 
share split. These problems aside, the available evidence is generally indicative of 
decreased volumes. What is debatable however, is whether this decrease is 
attributable to the split as the level of trading volume immediately prior to the split, 
against which the decrease is measured, appears to be abnormally high. 
The decrease in volumes is accompanied by an increase in the number of 
transactions. This somewhat contradictory result may be interpreted either as a 
general improvement in liquidity or, more specifically as an improvement in the 
liquidity of smaller investors. Of these two interpretations the latter appears to be 
more likely. 
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· 5. The bid-ask spread 
The bid-ask spread represents the difference between the prices at which a security 
may be bought or sold at a particular point in time. In principle the spread is set by 
applies in dealer markets, but the spread is then adjusted for factors specific to the 
dealer making a market in that security. This section will focus on changes in the 
spread around a share split. 
5.1. Changes in the bid-ask spread around the split 
As was the case with volumes, studies of changes in the bid-ask spreads 
subsequent to a share split have produced conflicting results . Copeland (1979), for 
instance, compared the relative spreads, being the absolute spread divided by the 
share price, at 1, 20 and 40 days before and after selected splits and found that 
there was a significant increase. Conversely, a later study by Murray (1985) , 
measured the change in the relative spread around the split for 100 over-the-counter 
(OTC) shares and found that there was no increase in the relative spread when 
compared to a control group. 
A later study by Conroy, Harris and Benet (1990) was specifically aimed at 
reconciling these conflicting results . In order to increase the accuracy of their 
findings they did not use the quoted bid-ask spread, as in the two earlier studies , but 
instead used the actual inside quotes (the highest bid and lowest ask available to an 
investor on that day) as these represented the actual spread available and not 
merely the one that was published. Using these quotes they compared the change in 
the absolute and relative spreads to a randomly selected control group. They found 
that the absolute spread decreased while the relative spread increased significantly 
after the share split. 
Maloney and Mulerin (1992) also examined the effect of a split on bid-ask spreads, 
but indirectly as part of a broader model of share price behaviour. Like Conroy , 
Harris and Benet they found an increase and decrease in the relative and absolute 
spreads respectively . 
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The effect of the split on the bid-ask spread is summarised in Figure 10. 
Figure 1 O: Summary of findings regarding changes in the bid-ask spread 
~easure 
afte r the split 
Relative Short term Increase Copeland (1979), Conroy, Harris 
and Benet (1990) , Maloney and 
Mulerin (1992) 
Long term Slight increase Murray (1985 ), Maloney and 
Mulerin (1992) 
Absolute Short term Decrease Conroy, Harris and Benet 
(1990), Maloney and Mulerin 
(1992) 
Long term No change Maloney and Mulerin (1992) 
5.2. Relative and absolute spreads 
It is apparent from Figure 10 that the conclusion drawn with regard to the effect of a 
split depends to a large extent on whether an absolute or relative measure is used. 
Because the relative measure takes the price of the share into account it allows the 
spreads on different shares to be compared . If this were not done then a conclusion 
could be made that two shares with a R1 spread were equivalent which would 
clearly be incorrect where the shares had prices of R 10 and R 100 respectively . 
Maloney and Mulerin (1992) argue differently. They assert that use of the relative 
spread is inherently problematic: "A more general critique of the analysis of bid-ask 
spreads and stock splits is the emphasis on relative spreads in the reported results . 
While the relative spread is one method of comparing liquidity cross-sectionally , the 
same measure can create estimation problems in time series analysis when the 
event being studied causes significant changes in stock prices. In such cases , 
results can be driven by changes in the denominator of the relative spread rather 
than being due to any change in the bid-ask differential." (Page 47) 
Despite this argument, it seems that if the issue is the liquidity cost of the spread 
then it is the relative bid-ask spread which is important. Their assertion that the 
change in the relative spread is driven by the change in the share price appears to 
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be accurate. But their further assertion, that the change in share price causes 
estimation problems is obscure as, after all , the change in price is the purpose of a 
split. 
5.3. Period sensitivity 
As with trading volumes, conclusions relating to the change in the bid-ask spread 
following the split may also be sensitive to the period over which that change is 
measured. While no direct work has been done on this question it is interesting to 
note that Murray (who found no increase in the relative spread) used a longer period 
than Copeland (1979) and Conroy, Harris and Benet (1990) (who both found that the 
relative spread increased) . 
Period sensitivity, hinted at by the above studies, is more evident in the work of 
Maloney and Mulerin (1992), particularly in the finding that the relative spread 
persistently declined from around 350 days prior to the split. The decline in relative 
spread occurred despite an increase in the absolute spread over the same period 
suggesting that the lower relative spread was a product of an increasing share price. 
Consistent with the suggestion of an increasing share price the period of study , 
being the 350 days prior to the split, coincides exactly with the period of share price 
appreciation observed by Lakonishok and Lev (1987) and Maloney and Mulerin 
(1992). After the split, the absolute spread decreased to a level equivalent to that 
prevailing before the equity appreciation began (+/- 350 days prior to the split) . Thus 
the split may return the spread to "normal" levels. 
5.4. Changes in the spread and changes in trading volume 
The increase in the relative spread is consistent with the decrease observed in the 
relative, split adjusted and (short term) value based measures of trading volume. But 
.before a conclusion can be drawn that the increase in the spread was caused by the 
decrease in trading volume it is necessary to determine whether there were other 
causes. It has been demonstrated that the size of spread is also related to a share's 
risk and the absolute level of its share price and it is conceivable that changes in 
either may influence the spread. 
Conroy, Harris and Benet (1990) investigated the relationship between the change in 
spread and factors including the change in share price, trading volume and risk by 
regressing the change in spread against these factors . On this basis they found that 
the change in the spread was, as they expected , linked to the change in trading 
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volume and to the change in the share price. It was however, independent of the 
increase in volatility. 
A link between the change in trading volumes and the bid-ask spread is also 
example, found that the relative spread was unusually low in the period immediately 
prior to the split during which unusually high trading volumes were also noted. The 
increase in the spread following the split is therefore consistent with the decrease in 
trading volumes identified in 4 above. 
5.5. Microstructure effects 
As discussed in chapter 2 on returns, the abnormal returns observed at the ex-date 
of a split may be due to microstructure effects, specifically an asymmetrical increase 
of the ask quote relative to the bid . As this increase accompanies the positive ex-
date returns it may be argued that the decrease in liquidity (suggested by the 
widening spread) is compensated for by positive ex-date returns. The split would 
then benefit existing shareholders through the positive return . 
5.6. Summary 
The relative bid-ask spread, at least over the short-term , appears to widen following 
a split while the absolute spread narrows. These conflicting movements in the 
different measures of the spread are caused by the decrease in the share price 
following the split which is not fully compensated for by the decrease in absolute 
spread. Accordingly , the increase in the relative spread is directly attributable to the 
change in price caused by the split. 
The change in spread is also sensitive to the period over which it is measured with 
shorter measurement periods tending to show evidence of an increase in the relative 
spread while longer periods tend to exhibit no change. This period sensitivity 
matches that displayed by measures of trading volumes . In part th is reflects the 
documented link between trading volumes and the bid-ask spread which was 
confirmed in relation to share splits by Conroy, Harris and Benet (1990). 
Considering the evidence regarding the change in the relative spread following a 
split, it seems that, as with trading volumes, a split causes liquidity to worsen or, at 
best, to remain unchanged. 
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6. Direct transaction costs 
The focus of this section is on the change in brokerage commissions and taxes 
("direct costs") around a share split. The only study to examine direct costs was 
Copeland (1979) who demonstrated, using a simulation model , that direct costs 
increased by 7 .1 % following a split. Apart from this there is only indirect evidence 
that the split would lead to higher direct costs. Coler and Schaefer (1988) for 
example, show that brokerage commissions, measured as a percentage of the value 
of a transaction, are inversely related to both the share price and the size of the 
transaction . 
If this relationship holds around a share split then Copeland's findings of higher 
transaction costs can be attributed to two effects. The first , is the decline in the 
share price resulting in a higher cost per transaction of similar value. The second 
effect, is the decline in the size of the average transaction which was confirmed by 
Maloney and Mulerin (1992). The first effect is an unavoidable outcome of the split. 
The second effect however, is avoidable because investors do not have to trade in 
smaller blocks of shares following the split. That they choose to, and incur higher 
costs as a consequence, indicates that there must be some benefit attached to 
trading in the smaller blocks of shares. So while there are increased costs , there is a 
corresponding benefit. 
As discussed in 4.4 above, the decrease in the average transaction size may also be 
related to an influx of smaller investors. If this is the case , then the additional costs 
suggested by the decline in the average transaction size would only apply to smaller 
investors. 
7. Odd-lot costs 
Odd-lot costs are additional charges levied on transactions of less than 100 shares. 
Recently, following the implementation of the JET system on the JSE, odd-lot costs 
have fallen away. All odd-lots are now dealt with through a specially designated odd-
lot broker where any odd-lot shareholder is given the price prevailing in the previous 
full lot transaction with no additional charges. Prior to this however, odd-lots still 
involved additional costs as is the case presently on U.S. exchanges such as the 
NYSE. 
Traditionally , the primary benefit of a split was seen as the reduction of odd-lot costs 
and the improvement in tractability enjoyed by smaller investors (Barker (1956)) . 
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Perhaps because the reduction of odd-lot costs is self evident or perhaps because 
the benefit is limited to smaller investors, there has not been a direct study of the 
change in odd-lots following a split. Contrary to the traditional view, the evidence 
available as to the effect of a split on odd-lots suggests that odd-lot costs increase 
io!i Ii ir.g a Spi/. 
The evidence referred to was provided in a study by Choi and Strong (1983) which 
showed that when-issued shares (contracts entitling the holder to receive the post-
split shares once they are issued) trade at a premium of about 1 % over the un-split 
shares. Their study also showed that the premium was higher where the share split 
was more likely to result in the creation of odd-lots such as in the case of a five for 
three split. From this they, together with other authors including Grinblatt, Masulis 
and Titman (1984) and Brennan and Copeland (1988), concluded that investors 
were willing to pay a premium for when-issued shares in order to avoid potential 
odd-lot costs. 
The problem with this conclusion is that it ignored the possibility that odd-lot costs 
may simultaneously be reduced by a split. Particularly for smaller inve~tors for whom 
the purchase of any shares prior to the split would have resulted in odd-lot costs. 
These smaller investors would then be paying the when-issued premium for the 
convenience of acquiring the shares prior to the split date. 
This suggests that the when-issued premium consists of two parts: a first part paid 
for the benefit of acquiring shares that will not become odd-lots after the split (a 
potential odd-lot premium) and a second part , paid for the benefit of acquiring shares 
prior to the split without having to incur odd-lot costs (a present odd-lot premium). 
This two-part explanation is consistent with Choi and Strong's finding of higher 
when-issued premiums where the split factor is likely to result in odd-lots . 
This two-part model is also consistent with the traditional view that a split benefits 
smaller investors. Smaller investors are primarily affected by present odd-lot costs 
which are reduced by a split. Conversely, larger investors are primarily affected by 
future odd-lots costs and so would be adversely affected as these cost are increased 
by a split. 
7.1. Odd-lots and returns 
Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman ( 1984) and Brennan and Copeland ( 1988) also 
suggested that the ex-date return may be due to potential odd-lot considerations . 
Investors who did not buy the share in the period between the announcement and 
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ex-date (because of potential odd-lots) enter the market at the ex-date resulting in 
the ex-date return . 
This suggestion implies that the pre-split share price includes discounted odd-lot 
-::::s:s ::: - c: ~::: ;s ·:·:':·,·. ;ts ··~rJe" value. What this fa:is to reco~r. ise is that some 
shareholders are unaffected by odd-lots prior to the split and so the pre-split share 
price should not include a discount ·for odd-lot costs . If this were not the case then 
the share would be undervalued prompting purchases by those investors who are 
unaffected by odd-lots forcing the share to return to its "true" value. 
As discussed in Chapter 2 on returns however, the ex-date return appears to relate 
to microstructure effects related to a clustering of orders at the ask quote at the ex-
date of a split. Consequently, if the influx of investors causes this clustering the 
removal of odd-lot costs may ultimately be responsible for the ex-date return . 
7.2. The economic significance of odd-lot costs 
The question of economic significance is important as it justifies whether odd-lot 
costs may be ignored when determining the effect of a split on liquidity. It is difficult 
to show that odd-lot costs are significant. Maloney and Mulerin (1992) attempted to 
do this and were only able to provide some weak anecdotal evidence: " ... we do not 
have information on small investors, but across the 826 institutions filing 13fs in 
1989, 124 held stocks in lots of 100 shares or less. The small-lot stocks held by 
these 124 funds were predominately standard industrial companies . This says that 
even institutional investors have small-lot holdings and we expect the frequency to 
be substantially higher for small investors." (Page 56) 
This shows that odd-lots do exist in institutional portfolios, but does not show that 
they are in any way significant. In any event, the significance of odd-lots may not lie 
in the odd-lots which exist but in those which would come into existence were a 
shareholder to adjust his holding. These latent odd-lot costs are likely to be more 
significant, both in terms of value and decision making than odd-lots already in 
existence. 
The strongest evidence that odd-lot costs are significant lies in the existence of 
when-issued premiums. Assuming the when-issued premium is paid to avoid odd-lot 
costs, the fact that a market for when-issued shares exists and, moreover, that 
investors are willing to pay a premium for them suggests that odd-lot costs must 
have some significance. 
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Furthermore, if the ex-date results in the influx of smaller investors it suggests that 
odd-lot : costs are important, but that their importance is limited to this group of 
shareholders . 
7.3. Summary 
It appears that the reduction of odd-lot costs by a split is not as simple as some 
literature suggests. Odd-lot costs may be divided into present and potential costs 
which are affected differently by a split. Evidence suggests that present odd-lot costs 
are reduced by the split while potential odd-lot costs are increased. As present odd-
lot costs relate to smaller investors (who are unable to trade prior to a spl it) and 
potential odd-lots relate to larger investors (who are able to trade prior to a split) it 
may be argued that smaller investors benefit from a split while larger investors are 
adversely affected by it. 
8. Normal trading range 
The normal or optimal trading range model is based on the differing effects which a 
split has on bid-ask spread and odd-lot costs . In essence the model holds that the 
split moves the share price into a range where the cost considerations of various 
groups of investors are balanced. This section will examine the normal trading range 
model , first in terms of its basic formulation , then in terms of empirical support . 
8.1 . Formulation 
The key features of the model were aptly summarised by Copeland (1979) : 
"For example, one often hears on Wall Street that there is an 'optimal ' price range 
for securities. Stocks which trade in this range are presumed to have lower 
brokerage fees as a percentage of the value traded and therefore appear to be more 
liquid. This 'optimal' range is considered to be a compromise between the desires of 
wealthy investors and institutions who will minimise brokerage costs if securities are 
high-priced, and the desires of small investors to minimise odd-lot costs if the 
securities are low-priced." (Page 115) 
While plausible, there is no direct evidence that the split event is the outcome of 
such a process, or that such a process determines the split factor. Research that 
does exist seems to indicate that there may well be a normal trad ing range fo r 
shares , but that this range is a function of the size of the firm and average prices in 
the market. 
8.2. Evidence 
The evidence which is available concerning the existence of a normal trading range 
is based primarily on work done by Lakonishok and Lev (1987) . They compared the 
average share prices for a sample of splitting firms to a control group for an 
extended period around the share split. This comparison revealed that there was no 
difference between the average price for the splitting and control groups in the fifth 
year prior to the split. However, closer to the split announcement the differential 
between the two groups widened as the average prices for the splitting firms 
increased by 96% with the result that they were more than 70% higher than those 
for the control group by the announcement month. After the split, this situation 
reversed and by the second month after announcement the differential had 
disappeared (which represented the average period between announcement and the 
ex-date) . From this point onwards the average prices were similar. The conclusion 
they drew from this was that the split followed a period of phenomenal growth in the 
share price which the split effectively adjusted back to "normal" levels. 
To determine whether management deliberately chose the split factor to adjust the 
share price to the "market average" they used a cross sectional re ression, with the 
split factor as the dependent variabl~. This indicated that the deviation in the share 
price from the average market price explained about 25% of the variability in the split 
factor. To increase the explanatory power of their model the regression was 
repeated but including the deviation of the firm's share price from the industry 
average as a second independent variable. The combination of the price deviations 
from the market and industry average prices explained 32% of the split factor. They 
concluded that the average market and industry prices are targets for the spl its but 
that other firm specific factors such as past prices may also affect the size of the 
split. Support for their conclusions was provided by Conroy, Harris and Benet (1990) 
and by McNichols and Dravid (1990). 
A different conclusion however, was drawn by Brennan and Copeland (1988) . Their 
study compared the share prices of a sample of share splits to a control group 
comprising 13 shares selected randomly from each month across the sample period. 
On this basis they found that the prices of the splitting group were above the prices 
for the random sample at both the announcement and ex-date. They interpreted this 
as indicating that the split factor was generally too small to return the shares to the 
normal trading range as represented by the market average. Brennan and Copeland 
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suggested that their different finding was due to the fact that Lakonishok and Lev 
selected larger firms in their control sample which created an upward bias resulting 
in the conclusion that the split had returned the share price to the market average. 
Lakonishok ana Lev's results were biased is not necessarily correct. Lakonishok and 
Lev selected their control group by matching each firm in the splitting sample with a 
firm in the same industry which had a similar total asset value. This is then not a 
upward bias but reflects the fact that firms who undertake share splits tend to be 
larger, in terms of the size of their total assets, than average firms in the market. 
8.3. Summary 
There does appear to be a normal range for shares. The hypothesis that this range 
is the outcome of competing cost considerations is feasible but has not been proved. 
Instead, evidence suggests that the range is a function of the size of the firm and 
average prices in the market. While the cost based normal trading m~del cannot be 
supported, there is still validity in the assertion that larger and smaller investors are 
affected differently by the split. As a broad statement on liquidity, allowing for 
different measures and periods of study, it may be said that larger inves'tors are 
adversely affected and that smaller investors positively affected by a split. 
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Chapter 6: Empirical work 
1. I. • r 
The previous chapter reviewed the literature available on the change in liquidity 
following a share sp 
lit. Following from that review, this chapter will focus on the deceptively simple 
question of how trading activity, which is one element of liquidity, changes following 
a share split. 
Despite its apparent simplicity the change in trading activity constitutes a theme 
which may be observed throughout all aspects of a share split. For example , the 
announcement return may be in anticipation of improved liquidity following the ex-
date of a split. This hypothesis however, is not consistent with the empirical 
evidence available from U.S. markets, which shows that volumes decline or at best 
remain unchanged following a split, but is consistent with the beliefs of U.S. market 
participants. 
Alternatively, trading activity may be linked to the return observed at the ex-date of a 
split. As discussed in Chapter 2, evidence suggests that the ex-date return is an 
outcome of the widening of the bid-ask spread. Other evidence discussed in chapter 
5 shows that the size of the bid-ask spread is related to the level of trading volume 
such that a decrease in volume is associated with a wider bid-ask spread. This 
suggests that the documented decline in volumes , following a split, is responsible for 
the wider spread which , in turn, is responsible for the ex-date return . 
The widening of the bid-ask spread could also be related to the increase in return 
volatility observed at the ex-date of a split. Chapter 3 suggested that , despite the 
presence of distortions caused by measurement effects , there is a genuine increase 
in volatility . Chapter 3 then showed that both the measurement effects and the 
genuine increase in volatility may be linked to the change in trading activity following 
a split. 
Understanding the change in trading activity is therefore essential to understanding 
the effect of a share split. The aim of this chapter is to understand this change with 
regard to shares on the JSE. 
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2. Statement of hypotheses 
An event, such as a share split, may have two possible effects on trading activity: 
a short-term effect. typified by 2 te porary ch2r.ge in the level o f activity: 
and/or 
2. a long-term effect, typified by a sustained change in activity . 
A short-term change is usually attributed to the event itself, or more particularly, to 
the information which it conveys as this information changes investors expectations 
and induces them to readjust their portfolios (refer chapter 3). Thus the short term 
effect is an accepted outcome of any informational event and may be 
accommodated within accepted information theory. 
Conversely, a long-term change in trading activity is not as easily accommodated 
within accepted information theory as investors should not keep adjusting their 
portfolios for the same information. This could mean that the change in activity is not 
due to information but to changes in other underlying structural factor.s such as the 
share's trading cost structure or its shareholder base. 
Thus to understand the effect of an event on trad ing activity it is necessary to 
separate any long and short-term changes. The aims of this study may be 
summarised as follows: 
1. Is there a change in trading activity following a split? 
2. Is th is a long-term or short term change in activity? 
Based on these questions two related null hypotheses may be established : 
H01: Trading volume (pre-spl it) Trading volume (post-split) 
H02: Change in trad ing volume (short-term) Change in trad ing volume (long-term) 
3. Limitations and assumptions 
The following limitations apply to the study: 
1. Sample size- in order to find share splits with the necessary information on 
volumes and which met the selection criteria a large proportion of the original 
share splits were excluded. This resulted in a small sample which limited the 
interpretations which could be made from the data. 
2. Methodology- the illiquid nature of trading activity on the JSE made 
...... .... ..... .. ...... -
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developed to accommodate the JSE trading characteristics . The use of these 
revised tests meant that the results were not directly comparable to the 
results from studies on U.S. markets. 
Other limitations and assumptions relating to the individual hypotheses and tests 
used are discussed in the relevant sections below. 
4. Methodology and data 
For the purposes of this study a share split was defined as a transaction which was 
announced between December 1990 and 30 June 19951 : 
which increased the number of shares in issue by a factor; 
which was identified as a "sub-division" or "sub-div" in the JSE Monthly 
Bulletin; and 
which was not accompanied by a simultaneous event, initiated by or with 
regard to the splitting firm, which may have affected the share capital of the 
firm . 
This sample of splits was then screened to include only those shares where the split 
announcement occurred within 3 months of the split ex-date. This screen was used 
as the effect of the split was more likely to be obscured by other contaminating 
events where there was a long period between the announcement and the ex-date. 
This resulted in a sample of 23 share splits. 
It may be argued that, as the splits chosen represent the entire population of share 
splits, tests should be structured accordingly. Alternatively, it may be argued that the 
1 The last date was limited to June 1995 as the JSE moved onto the JET computerised 
trading system from 3 March 1996. The move on to the JET system resu lted in large 
increases in trading volumes. Consequently , splits with announcement dates falling after June 
1995 would have had study periods extending beyond the move onto the JET system and 
thus their volumes would have been distorted. 
splits are a sample from a broader population of splits extending beyond the sample 
period . Under this second interpretation all · tests would need to be structured such 
that inferences could be drawn regarding the population from which the sample was 
taken. For the purposes of this study the latter position was adopted. 
4.1. Study period 
Evidence from U.S. markets showed that where the change in trading volume was 
measured over a longer period the study was more likely to find no change in trading 
volume. Shorter periods, on the other hand, tended to show that volumes decreased 
following a split primarily due to the presence of abnormally high volumes prior to the 
split announcement date. 
Consequently, any study period should be long enough to reveal this effect but 
should not be so long as to allow the effect of the split to be obscured by other 
intervening events. The study period should also be divisible into smaller sub-
periods to allow further analysis to enable the test to determine whether there was a 
long or short-term change in volume. These periods in turn needed to be long 
enough to include meaningful levels of activity as shares in the sample were 
characterised by thin trading volumes. 
; 
The followi 
I Period 
Period 1 
Period 2 
Period 3 
Period 4 
Period 5 
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ng study periods were chosen: 
Description 
A period of 61 trading days2 set around the first profit announcement3 
occurring at least three months prior to the split announcement date. 
A period of 61 trading days immediately prior to the day on which the split 
was announced. 
A period of 20 days falling a similar number of days after the announcement 
date as before the ex-date4 . 
A period of 61 trading days immediately following the day on which the ex-
date of the split occurred. 
A period of 61 trading days set around the first profit announcement 
occurring at least 3 months after the split ex-date 
These stu dy periods are illustrated below. 
Profit 
announcemen ti Announcement 
I I 
<--61 days- ·---61 days-- , 
Period 1 Period 2 
Ex-date 
<-20 days- · · --6 1 days-- -· 
Period 3 Period 4 
Profit 
announcement 2 
Period 5 
2 A trading day was defined as a day on which trading activity could occur i.e. all days 
week-ends and public holidays. excluding 
3 To ensur 
periods. Th 
e consistency the type of announcements were matched in the pre and post-split 
erefore, an interim profit announcement in period 1 was always matched to an 
ouncement in period 5. Likewise a year-end profit announcement in period 1 was 
ched to a year-end profit announcement in period 5. 
interim ann 
always mat 
4 The nu 
share. 20 d 
mber of days between the announcement date and the ex-date varied for each 
ays was chosen as it represented the minimum period between the announcement 
e. and ex-dat 
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4.2. Data 
For each of the shares selected the following information was gathered for months 
around the split event from the I-net Information Service (I-Net) , the JSE monthly 
.... ....... -
... :..... ,= .. 
Item Source 
Ex-date JSE Monthly Bulletin 
Split announcem_e_n_t_d_at_e _______ +-S_t_o_ck_P_r_e_ss""'"._M_a_c_G_re-=g~o_rs_l_n_fo_rm_at_io_n_S_e_rv_ic_e _ _ .., 
Profi t announcement dates Stock Press, MacGregors Information Service 
----------+-------~----------, 
The adjusted number of shares traded I-Net 
5. H01 and H02: Change in trading activity following a split 
5.1. Calculation 
To determine whether there was a change in trading volume5 across the split event 
a comparison was made of volumes across each of the periods identified in 4.1 
above. In doing so each trading day in the one period was paired with a trad ing day 
in the period which followed it. The differences between the volumes in the paired 
trad ing days were then combined to form a sample of differences and a matched 
sign test was used to determine whether this sample of differences indicated a 
change in activity across the comparison periods. 
A matched sign test was chosen as the data was characterised by a large number of 
trading days where no activity had occurred and also by individual trading days with 
very large trading volumes. These characteristics meant that the population from 
which the differences were sampled was probably not normal and therefore, 
necessitated the use of a non-parametric procedure such as the sign test. 
As the sign test is solely based on whether the difference is positive or negative it 
also has the advantage of allowing the sample of differences to be pooled acrqss all 
of the shares. This would not have been possible in a test where the magnitude of 
5 Trad ing volume was defined as adjusted trading volume which was calculated by increasing 
the volumes prior to the ex-date of the spl it by the split factor. 
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the difference was retained as data relating to different shares would not have been 
comparable due to differences in the size of the underlying firm and the number of 
shares that firm had in issue. 
Di = the number of days where the daily trading volume for share Xi over period 
Yi exceeded the daily trading volume for share Xi over period Zi. 
Where Xi included all of the shares in the sample and where Yi and Zi included 
periods 1 to 5. 
In other words Di was calculated for each of the comparison periods as follows: 
Yi Zi 
Comparison 1 Announcement period (period 2) Pre-split profit period (period 1) 
Comparison 26 Event period (period 3) Announcement period (period 2) 
Comparison 3 Ex-date period (period 4) Event period (period 3) . 
Comparison 4 Post-split profit period (period 5) Ex-date period (period 4) 
Comparison 5 Post-split profit period (period 5) Pre-split profit period (period 1) 
These periods were chosen as comparisons 1 through 4 showed the change 1n 
activity from study period to the next. Comparison 5 then showed the change across 
all of the study periods and summarised the long-term effect of the split. 
The test statistic was defined as follows: 
z* = Positive% - 50% 
-V 0.5 • (1 - 0.5)/n 
where Positive% = Di/n*100 
Where the comparisons resulted in zero differences the zero differences were 
excluded from the sample and the sample size was reduced accordingly . 
6 As the event period had only 20 days it was compared to its two comparison periods 3 
times. In other words days 1 to 20 in the event period were compared to days -30 to -11, and 
then to days -10 to +9, and then again to days +10 to +29 in the comparison periods (the 
match was not exact as the other event periods contained 61 days and consequently , day 1 in 
the event period was also compared to day +30 in the comparison periods). The results of 
these three comparisons were then combined to provide the sample of differences. 
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For example, the matched sign test for comparison 1 worked as follows: the trading 
volume in day -30 in period 2 was compared to the' volume in day -30 in period 1. 
Then the volume in day -29 in period 2 was compared to the volume in day -29 in 
period 1 a d so on for all of the remaining days (-28 to +28) in each period . Thus 
each sr.are ;:,r0viccc; a sam ;:: 1a cf 6, d1 ;-fe i er, 2s wnich were recoraed as positive 
(where the volume in period 2 exceeded the volume in period 1 ), as negative (where 
the volume in period 2 was less than the volume in period 1 ), or as zero (where the 
volume in period 2 equaled the volume in period 1 ). 
Next, all zero differences were excluded and the sample size reduced accordingly. 
This was done as a zero difference resulted from equal volumes and therefore did 
not indicate whether the volume in period 2 exceeded those in period 1, i.e. the 
difference did not provide a sign. 
The proportion of positive differences, out of the remaining sample of differences, 
across all shares was then determined. It was expected that this proportion would be 
equal to 50% as a random sample of daily volumes in one period would be expected 
exceed the daily volumes in another period half of the time. If volumes. in one period 
exceeded volumes in the other more often it would indicate that the volumes in the 
two periods were different and that this difference was possibly significant. 
5.2. Assumptions 
In using the matched sign test the following assumptions were made: 
1. the population of differences (Di) was continuous; 
2. the n differences were a random sample from the population of differences. 
As discussed above zero differences were excluded from the sample and the 
sample size was accordingly reduced. Typically, in a sign test , zero differences 
should be relatively rare as they would require the two comparison days to have 
exactly the same volumes . The current sample however, was characterised by a 
large number of days in which no trading activity occurred . 
This meant that it was relatively common for a zero difference to result as a day with 
no volume in one period would often be matched to a day with no volume in the 
comparison period. The adjustment was therefore necessary to obta in meaningful 
results otherwise the zero differences would have obscured the effects brought 
about by the split. 
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5.3. Results 
T;--'= r-=:- ·3l..: 'ts c : :~e :'=s ' ::: 1;: 1::- .::.: 2tc,;s is sumr1arised in Fig1Jre 11 wri ich shows the z* 
score and associated probabilities or P-values for the periods Yi as compared to 
periods ZL 
Figure 11: Results for matched sign test (full sample) 
Di n Zero Adj n Positive% z* P-value 
values 
Announcement compared to Pre-split 512 1404 574 830 61 .69% 6.73 99 .99 
Event compared to announcement 488 1403 488 915 53.33% 2.02 97 .83 
Ex-date compared to the event 607 1403 369 1034 58 .70% 5.60 99 .99 
Post-spl it compared to Ex-date 575 1403 291 1112 51 .71 % 1. 14 87.29 
Post-split compared to Pre-split7 662 1403 396 1007 65.74% 9.99 99.99 
As can be seen in Figure 11 above, trading volumes increased across the entire split 
event. Each period showed a significant proportion of higher volumes than the 
preceding period. The only exception was the comparison of the ex-date period 
(period 4) to the post-split profit period (period 5) which provided a positive, though 
not significant, proportion . Thus it may be said that volumes increased up to the split 
event, across the split event and that this increase did not abate. This result was 
unexpected as U.S. studies suggested that trading volumes declined following a 
split. 
5.4. Event effects 
As discussed in the design of this study (refer 2 above) the arrival of information in 
the market may result in temporary increases in volume as investors respond to the 
information. An additional test was therefore run which attempted to remove the 
possible effects of the known informational events occurring during the study period 
7 The comparison of the post-split period to the pre-spl it period summarises the changes 
across each of the consecutive study periods. However, the nature of the test is such that the 
proportions of differences are not cumulative and therefore this final proportion is not the sum 
of the preceding proportions. 
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i.e.: the pre-split profit announcement, the split announcement, the ex-date and the 
post-split profit announcement. 
This additional test was similar to that described in 5.1 above but was based on 
the profit announcements and the days closest to the announcement and the ex-
date. As such the revised comparisons should not have been affected by any event 
effects and thus provided a clearer indication of the underlying change in volumes. 
The revised periods are set out below. 
Revised period 
Period 1 
Period 2 
Period 3 
Period 4 
Period 5 
Description 
A period of 40 trading days around the 21 days around first profit 
announcement prior to the split announcement date i.e. days -30 to -11 and 
days +11 to +30. 
A period of 40 trading days prior to the 21 days prior to the day on which the 
split was announced i.e. days -11 to -61. 
A period of 20 days falling a similar number of days after the announcement 
date as before the ex-date. 
A period of 40 trading days following the 21 days following to the day on 
which the ex-date of the split occurred i.e. days +11 to +61 . 
A period of 40 trading days around the 21 days around the first profit 
announcement following the split ex-date i.e. days -30 to -11 and days +11 
to +30. 
Figure 12: Results for the matched sign test (revised periods) 
Di n Zero Adj n Positive% z* P-value 
values 
Announcement compared to Pre-split 284 920 361 559 50.81 % 0.38 64 .80 
Event compared to Announcement 315 920 328 592 53.21 % 1.56 94 .06 
Ex-date compared to the Event 401 920 242 678 59.14% 4.76 99.99 
Post-split compared to Ex-date 380 920 190 730 52 .05% 1.11 86.65 
Post-split compared to Pre-split 445 920 266 654 68 .04% 9.23 99 .99 
As can be seen in Figure 12 the overall pattern of differences is similar to that from 
the original sample except that the proportion of differences between the 
announcement and pre-split profit periods was no longer significant (50,81 %, z* 
0,38). Such a decrease could either be attributable to there having been: 
77 
higher volumes immediately prior to the split announcement date; or 
lower volumes immediately around the pre-split profit announcement. 
It may also be observed that use of the revised periods reduced the significance of 
tna propon:i n ,elating co t,-ie oIT,pariscn f li":e c \e r, t and ann , ..L--; cemenr ~e ~i c.J6. 
This decrease however, appeared to be due more to the reduction in sample size as 
the proportion of 53 ,21 % is very similar to the original proportion of 53 ,33%. 
5. 4. 1. Revised event calculation 
To provide a more precise view of how trading volumes changed around the split 
event the calculation described in 5.1 above was again repeated using narrower 
study periods. These were derived by dividing each of the original periods (except 
the event period (period3)) into sequential periods of 20 days. For example, the pre-
split profit period was divided into 3 sub-periods pre1 , pre2, and pre3. Pre1 covered 
days -30 to -11 , pre2 days -98 to +10 and pre3 days +11 to +30. The proportion of 
positive differences was then calculated across each of these periods as in 5.1 e.g. 
pre3 was compared to pre2 and ann1 was compared to pre3. These comparisons of 
the narrower periods across the split event provided a more detailed view of the 
changes in trading volume. The results of this comparison are set out in Figure 13. 
Figure 13: Proportion of positive differences across the split event 
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Of all the comparisons only three were significant: 
"a"- the comparison of the second announcement sub-period (ann2) to the first 
announcement sub-period (ann1) (z* 1,31 , p-value 90,3%) ; 
"b"- the comparison of the third announcement sub-period (ann3) to the second 
announcement sub-period (ann2) (z* 1,94, p-value 97,4%) ; and 
"c" the comparison of the first ex-date sub-period (ex1) to the event period 
(event) (z* 2,46 , p-value 99,3%). 
This showed that the reduction of the proportion in Figure 12, for the comparison of 
the announcement period and pre-split profit period, was due to higher volumes in 
the period immediately prior to the announcement (marked "a" and "b") . From the 
graph it appeared as if there was a sustained increase in volumes immediately prior 
to the announcement. This increase appeared to be in anticipation of the 
announcement of the split. 
The increase in volumes following the ex-date (marked "c") was exa~merated as it 
was measured against the slightly lower volumes in the event period . The ex-date 
increase was however, genuine and volumes in this period were higher than in the 
periods prior to the announcement date. 
5.5. Potential anomalies 
It was possible that these results were affected by anomalies relating to the choice of 
methodology or in the data. Specifically, two possibilities were considered : 
1. the order in which trading days in the comparison periods were paired may 
have introduced bias due to some anomaly in the order of the data; 
2. the adjustment, described in 5.1 above, made for zero differences may have 
introduced bias . 
5. 5. 1. Data Order 
It was possible that the data was arranged in such a way that the pairs tended to 
provide a higher proportion of positive differences. To ensure that this was not the 
case the tests were repeated with the data in each of the comparison periods 
ordered randomly e.g. day +30 in period 2 was no longer automatically compared to 
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day +30 .in period 1, but was compared randomly to any day -30 through +30 in 
period 1. 
Figure 14: Results for the matched sign test (full random sample) 
Di n Zero Adjn Positive% z* P-value 
values 
!Announcement compared to Pre-split 516 1404 571 833 61 .94% 6.89 99.99 
Event compared to announcement 472 1403 486 917 51.47% 0.89 81 .33 
Ex-date compared to the event 626 1403 359 1044 59.96% 6.44 99.99 
Post-split compared to Ex-date 566 1403 311 1092 51 .83% 1.21 88.49 
Post-split compared to Pre-split 670 1403 385 1018 65.82% 10.09 99.99 
The results, in Figure 14 above, were similar to the original results (refer Figure 11 ). 
The only compafison which changed significantly was the comparison of the event 
period to the announcement period . This comparison originally provided a significant 
positive proportion of 53.33%. Based on the randomised data this proportion 
reduced to 51,47% (which was not significant). This meant that volumE:s in the event 
period may not be significantly different from those in the announcement period but 
that the other conclusions reached based on the original data remained valid . 
Figure 15: Results for the matched sign test (revised random sample) 
Di n Zero Adjn Positive% z* P-value 
values 
Announcement compared to Pre-split 291 920 356 564 51 .60% 0.76 77 .64 
Event compared to announcement 318 920 320 600 53.00% 1.47 92 .92 
Ex-date compared to the event 427 920 233 687 62 .15% 6.37 99 .99 
Post-split compared to Ex-date 370 920 185 735 50.34% 0.18 57 .14 
Post-split compared to Pre-split 447 920 251 669 66 .82% 8.70 99.99 
The test on the revised non-event sample was also repeated using randomised data. 
Use of the randomised data again resulted in changes in all of the comparison 
proportions , however, no change in the significance of any of the proportions 
resulted. Accordingly, the conclusions reached based on the original revised data 
remained valid . 
5. 5. 2. Adjustment for zero values 
The adjustment whereby all zero values were excluded from the sample may have 
introduced bias into the results . As can be seen in Figure 11 and Figure 12 the 
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number of zero values represented a large proportion of the original sample and 
. . 
revised samples. For example, the comparison of announcement period (period 2) to 
the pre-split profit period (period 1) for the full sample in Figure 11 showed a higher 
number of zero values (574) than positive differences (512) (i .e. where the 
ann unce~en~ cays voii.:rr.e 6Xc6ed6c tne ~re-sp,·· pr f;: days vo urT.e). 
Yet this did not represent a deficiency in the methodology so much as a 
characteristic of trading activity on the JSE. The evidence was still consistent with 
the conclusion that trading activity had increased. However, to understand the nature 
of this change further analysis was done to determine to what extent the result was 
attributable to: 
1. a change in the frequency with which trade occurs (in this case the number 
of days on which trade occurred) , and/ or 
2. a change in the total number of shares traded . 
5. 5. 3. Frequency of trade 
A comparison of the proportion of trading days, in which trade occurred , across each 
of the study periods demonstrated that there was a change in the frequency of 
trading activity around the split. 
Figure 16: Proportion of days with trade across periods 1 to 5 
Total trading Days with % Days with 
days trade trade 
Pre-spl it (period 1) 1403 590 42.1% 
Announcement (period 2) 1403 596 42.5% 
Event (period 3) 460 222 48 .3% 
Ex-date (period 4) 1403 845 60.2% 
Post-split (period 5) 1403 860 61 .3% 
In period 1 and 2, only 42 , 1 % and 42,5% of the days had any trading volume. The 
proportion increased slightly in period 3 to 48 ,3%. The main increase however, 
occurred after the ex-date where the proportion improved to 60,2% where it 
remained to the post-split profit period . This change in frequency meant that if a 
comparison were made for example, based on the original full sample, of period 5 
and period 1 it would be expected that period 5 would automatically show positive 
differences (Di) for at least 270 days (860 - 590) as the comparison days in period 1 
had no volumes. 
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To observe the change in frequency more precisely the frequencie$ were calculated 
across the narrower 20 day sub-periods used in 5.4.1. The results of this calculation 
are set out in the graph below. 
Figure 17: frequenc:; o f trade across he split event 
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Figure 17 clearly shows the sustained increase in trading frequency following the ex-
date of the split (marked "d"). 
This increase in trading frequency following the split was not limited to a few of the 
sample shares but could be observed across the whole sample. To test this a 
comparison was made using a matched sign test (as described in 5.6.1 above) 
wherein the difference between the number of days in which trade occurred in one 
period was compared to the number of days in which trade occurred in the 
comparison period . The proportion of positive differences was then determined and 
this proportion was tested for significance using the following test statistic: 
z* = Positive% - 50% 
"10.5 • (1 - 0.5)/n 
where Positive% = Di/n*100, 
and where Di = the number of shares where the number of days in which 
trading activity occurred over period Yi exceeded the number 
of days in which trading activity occurred over period Zi , 
and where Yi and Zi were the same as for 5.1 above. 
82 
5. 5. 4. Assumptions 
In using the matched sign test the following assumptions were made: 
1. the population of differences (Di) w?:s continuous· 
2. the n differences are a random sample from the population of differences. 
5. 5. 5. Results 
The following table shows the proportion of shares where the frequency of trade in 
one period exceeded the frequency of trade in the comparison period . 
Figure 18: Proportion of shares where days with trade exceeds the comparison period 
Di n Positive% z• P-value 
Announcement compared to Pre-split 23 11 47.83% (0.21) 58 .32 
Event compared to announcement 23 15 65.22% 1.46 92.79 
Ex-date compared to the event 23 18 78.26% 2.71 99.65 
Post-split compared to Ex-date 23 12 52.17% 0.21 58 .32 
Post-split compared to Pre-split 23 21 91 .30% 3.96 99.99 
The comparison of the post-split profit period (period 5) to the pre-split profit period 
(period 1) summarised the effect across the entire split event and showed that 21 of 
the 23 shares in the sample had a higher proportion of days traded following the 
split. Analysis of the change across the split event revealed that the change occurred 
at the ex-date (period 3) as the comparison of the ex-date period to the event period 
resulted in a significant proportion (78,26%, p-value 99,65%). This is consistent with 
the results in Figure 16 and Figure 17. 
5.6. Total number of shares traded 
An increase in trading frequency did not necessarily mean that there was an 
increase in the total numbers of share traded following the split. Another comparison 
was therefore made of the total number of shares traded , for each of the shares in 
the sample, across each of the study periods. 
A matched sign test was employed to determine whether the proportion of 
differences between the total shares traded was significant. 
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Di = the num~r of shares in the sample where the total volume over period Yi 
exceeded the total volume over period Zi. 
Where Yi and Zi included periods 1 to 4. In other words Di was calculated for each of 
Yi Zi 
Comparison 1 Announcement period (period 2) Pre-split profit period (period 1) 
Comparison 2 Ex-date period (period 4) Announcement period (period 2) 
Comparison 3 Post-split profit period (period 5) Ex-date period (period 4) 
Comparison 4 Post-split profit period (period 5) Pre-split profit period (period 1) 
The test statistic was defined as follows : 
z* = Positive% - 50% 
'10.5 • (1 - 0.5)/n 
where Positive% = Di/n*100. 
5.6.1. Data 
The data used in the previous tests was adjusted for this test as the data contained 
periods of thin trading and single days with extraordinarily large volumes . This meant 
that, for some shares, one day's trade could conceivably equal the sum of all of the 
other 61 days trade combined . 
In the previous tests the effect of such days was limited as they would only have 
counted for one difference (Di) out of the entire sample of differences across all of 
the shares. The potential effect on a comparison of shares however, would have 
been significant. 
To adjust for days with very large trading volumes the following two adjustments 
were made: 
1. The adjusted total number of shares traded was calculated by subtracting the 
largest 3 days' trade in each period from each share's total volume for that 
period (adjusted 1 ); 
2. The sum of the 3 days with the largest trade and the 3 days with the smallest 
trade were subtracted from the total number of shares traded . These 
volumes were then replaced by the average volumes (calculated excluding 
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the 3 largest and 3 smallest days) . The total volume for each share was then 
calculated (adjusted 2). 
These adjustments were designed to remove any outliers from the sample . Two 
different results would be obtained. The test would then not be reflecting the effect of 
a split as much as the effect of the adjustment. The use of two adjustments would 
allow the magnitude of the adjustment effect to be determined. 
The event period (period 3) created a problem in that it contained only 20 trading 
days compared to 61 days in the other periods. To compensate for this the adjusted 
total volumes over the event date were multiplied by 3,05 to equate to 61 days. 
Adjusted 1 's volumes were calculated by subtracting only the largest day's trade 
instead of the 3 largest day's trade. Adjusted 2's volumes were calculated by 
deduction the sum of the largest and smallest day's volumes and not the sum of the 
3 largest and 3 smallest days. 
5. 6. 2. Assumptions 
In using the matched sign test the following assumptions were made: 
1. the population of differences (Di) was continuous; 
2. the n differences are a random sample from the population of differences. 
5.6.3. Results 
The results are set out in two tables below for adjusted 1 and adjusted 2. 
Figure 19: Differences in total volumes (adjusted 1) 
n Positive Positive% z* P-va lue 
Announcement compared to Pre-split 23 16 69.57% 1.88 96.99 
Event compared to announcement 23 10 43.48% (0.63) NIA 
Ex-date compared to event 23 15 65.22% 1.46 92.79 
Post-split compared to Ex-date 23 14 60.87% 1.04 85.08 
Post-split compared to Pre-spl it 23 18 78.26% 2.71 99.66 
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Figure 20: Differences i.n total volumes (adjusted 2) 
n Positive Positive% z* P-value 
!Announcement compared to Pre-split 23 16 69 .57% 1.88 96.99 
E ;s:-.t ::or.;i:,ared tc 2-.r.ci.;r.cemem 23 10 43.45c,s (0.63j N;A 
Ex-date compared to event 23 15 65.22% 1.46 92.79 
Post-split compared to Ex-date 23 14 60.87% 1.04 85 .08 
Post-split compared to Pre-split 23 18 78.26% 2.71 99.66 
The results based on adjustment 1 and adjustment 2 were identical (primarily as a 
result of the small sample size) . This did provide some comfort that the results were 
not being distorted by the nature of the adjustments made. 
The results showed once again that there was an increase in total vplumes across 
the split event 2nd that this increase persisted to the post-split profit period. This 
result was not as positive as those in 5.3 above but did confirm the long-term 
increase in trading volumes. What was of particular interest was to determine where 
within the study period this increase occurred. The results in Figure 19 and 
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Figure 20 suggested that the increase happened in both the announcement period 
and the ex-date period. The increase to the ex-date period may have been distorted 
by the lesser number of days in the event period (even after the adjustments were 
made) . Consequently, an additional direct comparison of the ex-date and 
that adjusted total volumes were higher in the ex-date period for 15 out of the 23 
shares (65,22%, p-value 92,79%). Whilst this proportion was not highly significant it 
did follow a decline in total volumes in the event period . This suggested that the ex-
date did result in an increase in total volumes. 
5.7. Summary 
Based on these results both H01 and H02: 
H01: Trading volume (pre-split) Trading volume (post-split) 
H02: Change in trad ing volume (short-term) Change in trad ing volume (long-term) 
would be rejected as trading volumes were persistently higher following a spl it. The 
changes in trading volumes however, appear to be more subtle than in itially 
anticipated for the following reasons: 
a split appeared to have both a long term and a short-term effect on trading 
volumes; 
these effects occurred at different times . 
The results in the previous sections may be summarised as the answers to two 
questions. These are set out below. 
Figure 21 : Results summary 
Was there an increase in trading Was there an increase in total 
frequency from the previous period? volumes from the previous period? 
Pre-split profit period NIA NIA 
Announcement period No Yes 
Event period Yes* No 
Ex-date period Yes Yes* 
Post-split profit period No No 
Significant but marg ina lly so. 
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The split appeared to increase trading volumes at the announcement of the split and 
following the ex-date. The increase at the announcement of the split appeared 
immediately prior to the split announcement which suggested that it was in 
anticipation of the announcement and so was an event effect. This increase was 
represented by an increase in total vo1 urr; es but not by an increase in trading 
frequency. Total volumes- then appeared to decline in the following (event) period 
suggesting that the announcement increase in trading volumes was temporary. 
The increase following the ex-date and was characterised by an increase in total 
shares traded and by an increase in trading frequency. These increases did not 
reverse in the post-split profit period and thus were of a long-term nature. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
1h2 :nc,sas.s ir ·,;:;;-::,~:; C11u:T, cs prior to the a:-,nou,, cemem cf u~e spiit is cc ;-;s:stem 
with the findings of U.S. studies d_iscussed in chapter 5. The increase in trading 
activity at the ex-date however, is not inconsistent with U.S. findings . If this increase 
is analysed it is apparent that this increase is characterised by marginally significant 
increase in total volumes and by very significant increase in trading frequency . 
No U.S. study examines the "frequency of trade" as such (probably as U.S. markets 
do not suffer from the problem of thin trading which characterises the JSE). Maloney 
and Mulerin (1992) however, showed that the number of transactions increased 
following the ex-date a split. A similar increase was noted by Manan and Uliana 
(1994) who found an increase in the number of transactions following the ex-date of 
a split on the JSE.· If the increase in trading frequency and the increase in the 
number of transactions are related it may be argued that the increase in frequency 
identified in the current study is consistent with U.S. studies. 
The question is then why an increase is total volumes is observed on the JSE 
whereas it is not observed in U.S. studies . The answer appears to lie in the fact that 
the JSE is so thinly traded . 
As Bradfield states in his assessment of estimation problems caused by th in trading 
on the JSE: "One of the initial conclusions in this analysis is that the th inly traded 
phenomenon on the JSE is fairly severe . For example , it was found that 
approximately one third of stocks are not traded on average, for at least one week in 
every four week period ." (page 25) . 
This problem was also noted in the above study. Figure 16 showed that the 
frequency of trade was around 40% prior to the split and that this improved to 
around 60% after the split . It was also noted that the data contained shares where a 
single day's trading volume could exceed the cumulative volume over the remaining 
60 days of the study periods. 
From this it may be hypothesised that both the U.S. exchanges and the JSE 
experience an increase in trading frequency following the ex-date. On the JSE 
however, liquidity is so low prior to the split that the change in frequency has a 
material effect on overall volumes. While this hypothesis is consistent with the 
current results the results do not provide conclusive evidence of its validity and 
further investigation is needed. 
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As discussed in Chapter 5, ~n increase in the number of transactions and a decline 
in total volumes means investors must either be trading in smaller blocks of shares 
or that there is a decline in the activity of larger investors and an increase in the 
activity of smaller investors. These smaller investors wc~lc r2.·1s r.2d a r1 2rginal 
effect on overall trading volumes but significant effect the number of transactions. 
No definitive answer could be determined based on the U.S. literature. 
If the current findings are applied to this issue they support the second possibility , 
namely that smaller investors enter the market following the split ex-date. The first 
possibility was only considered as it was assumed that the change in total volumes 
and the number of transactions occurred at the same time . 
The findings from the current study show that the change in total volumes and the 
change in the number of transactions occurred at different times . Assuming that U.S. 
markets show a consistent pattern, this indicates that the decrease in average 
number of shares per transaction cannot be due to investors trading in smaller 
blocks of shares. 
If the pattern of changes in trading activity on the JSE does in fact indicate the 
entrance of smaller investors into the market it provides evidence consistent with the 
models presented in chapter 4 which explain the increase in true volatility following 
the ex-date of a split. Section 6.1.3 (Mixture of distributions hypothesis ("MOH")) 
suggested that the sustained increase in volatility following the ex-date was related 
to the increase in the number of transactions. The current study provides evidence 
consistent with a sustained increase in the number of transactions occurring 
immediately after the ex-date. 
Section 7 (Noise traders) suggested that the entrance of smaller investors could lead 
to the increase in volatility . This could occur either through an increase in the 
number of transactions (as discussed above) or through a change in the market's 
expectations as these smaller investors may have systematically different 
expectations to the investors who traded in the share prior to the split. 
Finally, chapter 4 also suggested that a persistent increase in volatility could only be 
caused by information if: 
1. the structure of the markets' expectations were permanently changed (such 
as would occur with the entrance of smaller investors with systematically 
different expect:: tions) ; or 
2. if there was an increase in the amount of internal information reaching the 
market e.g. by an increase in the amount of attention paid to the share . 
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The current study does not pr~vide any insight as to whether such an increase in the: 
amount of information occurs following a split. This possibility is however, circular as 
if the split enables more investors to trade the attention directed at the share 
ircr<s?.SeS res Lil~::-, i" :::. - ; cr-=2s2 in infcrrr:af on. T er2 is no o~her e'tidence to 
confirm this and it is thus a question for further study. 
In conclusion , it appears that a share split does result in a sustained increase in 
liquidity on the JSE. This finding contradicts findings based on U.S. exchanges 
which tend to show that liquidity decreases or remains unchanged following a split. 
The difference in these findings may be attributed to the illiquid nature of the JSE. 
Both the current findings and those from U.S. exchanges show that there is an 
increase in the number of transactions or frequency of trade following the split. In the 
U.S. however, this increase in frequency does not cause a material increase in total 
volumes. On the JSE volumes are so low prior to the split that the change in 
frequency does have a material effect on total volumes. This increase in frequency is 
sustained following a split which in turn results in the finding of a sustained increase 
in total volumes . 
The results of the study also suggest a number of avenues for possible research . 
The hypothesis was proposed that the increase in trading frequency following the 
ex-date is the cause of the increase in total volumes following the ex-date on the 
JSE. 
This could be tested by controlling the level of trading frequency of the individual 
shares prior to the split. For example the shares could be stratified into high and low 
trading frequency sub-samples and the results compared for each sub-sample. If 
this hypothesis is correct then only the low frequency sub- sample should show a 
significant increase in total volumes following the ex-date. The current sample 
however, is too small for such a stratification to be effective. 
Another possibility is to repeat the study with a sample of splits occurring after the 
introduction of the JET trading system on the JSE. Because the introduction of the 
JET system caused a dramatic improvement in liquidity it is possible that increase in 
total volumes may not occur after the ex-date as the increase in frequency would no 
longer be material. 
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